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    1.Introduction 
Despite its dazzling mathematical sophistication, the magnificent neoclassical scheme, 
designed to explain the rhythm and pattern of economic growth through the evolution of 
factor availabilities, turned out to have a limited intellectual out-turn, to suffer a number of 
serious conceptual deficiencies and to be insufficiently persuasive in empirical analyses. 
Equally important, it proved analytically barren and rather unproductive from a development, 
policy point of view. The low level of development and increasingly noticeable poverty in 
Southeastern Europe, and not so long ago in the developed West, used until quite recently to 
be explained by the scarcity of some strategically important resources, above all capital. 
Human capital has only rarely and, in fact, exceptionally been referred to. The low level of 
non-human wealth was treated as the key and practically ultimate cause  of the modest 
amount of income. The insufficient quantities of precious non-human resources, with capital 
as the decisively most important production factor, could presumably be explained through 
the low rates of growth at which these resources had been expanded in the past. But what 
accounts for such inadequate rates of growth? It turned out that the widely differentiated 
wealth of nations and equally differentiated rates of its expansion, both in terms of total 
magnitudes and in per capita terms, could not be treated as causes of unequal development 
but had rather to be explained themselves.  
This kind of reasoning directly leads into examining widely differing patterns of 
behavior of people with respect to resource use and expansion and the reasons because of 
which people manage to extract widely differing effects out of available quantities of the 
production factors. Thus, it i s not the availability of resources themselves that accounts for 
differences in the levels development and the rates of growth but rather what, how and why 
people do with the income and wealth at their disposal. The basic component to be examined 
in the development nexus is not the quantity of various goods and factors of production, nor 
the quantitative relations among them, modeled in various ways, but the behavior of people 
and organizations which produce such a variegated factor availability in the first place. This is 
the way in which  institutions rather than the quantities of wealth or amounts of certain 
resources come to occupy the center of the complex and ill-understood development scene. 
Two distinct approaches dealing with the role of institutions in development have evolved. 
Chronologically and conceptually the first one starts with basic development issues and then 
grows into an extended analysis of institutions as powerful determinants of growth 
(exemplified, among others by Stigliltz 1988). The second one sets out with analysis of 
institutions themselves and subsequently unfolds into an examination of their dynamic, 
developmental implications (exemplified by, say, North 1995/1990/). Each approach has its 
advantages and both merge into a broader, more complete elucidation of the next to unwieldy 
development story.  
It has not been clearly recognized that the explanations of growth through factor 
availabilities are largely tautological. If the levels of income are explained by the available 
quantities of the production factors, or, more generally, by the existing wealth, and if 
additional and extraneous factors are not resorted to account for wide differences in what 
people do with their wealth and the effects extracted from it, then the generalized output is 
explained by wealth and the increment of wealth by output, so that the wealth is ultimately 
explained by itself. The various vicious circles of poverty, so popular in the early development 
literature (cf. Nurkse 1962, ch. 10, pp. 247-53; Nurkse 1963, pp. 263, 266; Meier 1963, pp. 60-4; Myint 1963, pp. 96, 107, 118), are a derived and somewhat remote manifestation of the 
circular reasoning which was, at least partly, woven into these analyses. Again, to break out of 
the intellectual circulus vitiosus one needs to bring in the factors which are outside of the 
interdependent conglomerate of the physical quantities and might be interpreted as the 
determining causes. Such factors can only be those affecting and, indeed, fundamentally 
determining economic behavior of individuals and organizations, which once more leads to 
institutions as the likely determinants of the economic growth and prosperity. 
Recognizing the importance of institutions is a part of a much broader approach 
emphasizing a fundamental two-pronged feature of the development process. Development 
does certainly contain the process of a steady, and hopefully lasting and sustainable, increase 
of the quantities of goods and services as an unavoidable base of individual and social 
welfare. But, in parallel with it there has to develop the set of mechanisms regulating the 
material development itself as well as the immensely complex constellation of processes of 
the current functioning of the economy. The change of what Marx used to call material base 
of the society calls for the timely adjustment of the means and ways of controlling and 
steering the economy, the levers and devices of managing its current functioning and, 
particularly, its development. This is what in the contemporary literature becomes more and 
more frequently referred to as the issue of governance (UNDP 2000, pp. 4-5).  
Governance may be defined as the capacity to control and manage, to promulgate and 
steer and to propagate and disseminate economic and, more broadly, social development 
while maintaining its sustainability and the political consensus needed to back the rich and 
versatile, steadily changing complex of directing, guiding and regulatory actions. Any society 
has to develop not only its productive capacity but also its ability to direct and manage itself. 
It is evident that the economic base of the society, in order to develop successfully, has to be 
managed and controlled, but equally evident is the need for a rapid development of the control 
system itself. To be effective, governance has to be continually developed. The test of the 
quality of governance and the indicator of its effectiveness is the degree to which it makes it 
possible to utilize the available resources and particularly to maintain a high rate of growth of 
their expansion. The proof of good governance is always in terms of what it gives through 
economic growth and how it enhances the welfare of the populace. Social development 
cannot unfold successfully unless the governance mechanisms are efficaciously developed as 
well. Insisting on just material development will sooner or later generate the bottlenecks in the 
vitally important regulating and control mechanisms and the material development itself will 
inevitably grind to a halt. 
One important, in contemporary conditions vital, dimension of (good) governance is 
the degree of transparency and accountability with which public functions are being 
performed. The present conditions in the preponderant part of the world, and Southeastern 
Europe does certainly not appear to be an exception in that respect, call for a massive popular 
participation in the development venture, and this in turn calls for wide-ranging 
decentralization in all areas of decision making. Both require a continuous and efficient 
popular control over the centers of the governmental – and, more generally, public – decision 
making and policy implementation. Accountability is vital. The power centers to be controlled 
don’t consist exclusively of governmental institutions with corresponding parliamentary, 
judicial and executive authorities, but comprise a much wider range of organizations 
including the political parties, the agencies involved in the electoral process, the mass media 
and the nongovernmental organizations. An aspect of governance, which has to be both 
carefully supervised and continually improved, concerns the manner in which public affairs 
are managed, particularly with respect to protection and respect for individual and collective 
(ethnic etc.) human rights. Another aspect deserving close and permanent attention is the 
tangle of relations towards the neighboring states and the international community in general.  The failure to develop the requisite governance machinery and the  accompanying 
procedural infrastructure could be taken  as one of the major determinants of the recently 
observed slow growth of economies in the Southeasteuropean countries and of the resulting 
and accompanying unsatisfactory social development and belated civilizational emancipation. 
In view of the fact that the existing institutional order represents both operating support and 
regulatory framework for any kind of governance, one completes the full circle and comes 
again to the institutional set-up as the strategic determinant of economic growth and social 
development. Institutions seem to represent a wide area in which major causes of 
developmental slowdown and civilizational lag are to be searched and eventually identified. 
At the same time this is an area in which most reforms will be taking place, an area in which 
the overall modernization will have to be initiated and to which a good deal of intellectual 
potential and political strength will have to be directed. 
    2. Institutional Framework as a Precondition for Effective Governance 
Institutions can be examined as a general phenomenon, abstracting from the 
idiosyncratic features of time and place. Or else, they can be analyzed as concrete, quite 
specific and unrepeatable social arrangements for regulating human behavior in the most 
diverse areas of life. I n pondering over the peculiar long run development trends in 
Southeastern Europe one finds out quickly that both approaches give valuable insights into 
the developmental and civilizational destiny of this region. Very general considerations of 
institutional development find a ready application to the Southeasteuropean realities. On the 
other hand, taking into account the distinct tenets of institutions prevailing in this part of the 
continent throws an extraordinary light on the rhythm and directions of its development. It 
also provides a rich source of hypotheses about the causes and consequences of frequent, deep 
and painful changes that have almost uninterruptedly bedeviled this region. The research 
strategy incorporated in this study will endeavor to reflect both characteristics of the 
institutional analysis placed into the context of the Southeasteuropean realities. The first part 
of the study will center on the general ingredients and attributes of institutions, with a view to 
the specific traits of the region under consideration. The second half will switch to the more 
specific analysis and be devoted to identifying the institutional determinants of 
Southeasteuropean development idiosyncrasies. The first part will also provide a general 
analytical framework, while the second part will concentrate on the concrete applications of 
this framework. The purpose of the second part is, in particular, to spell out the implications 
of the singular, frequently unparalleled institutional setup and its equally unique development.   
2.1 Technology and Institutions: the interdependence between the production and the 
    control system 
The point most strongly emphasized in the introduction is the inadequacy of an 
approach to development analysis and policy which would be based exclusively on the 
available resources and the known and predictable set of technological relations connecting 
them. Viewed in the perspective of the development potential, any economic system consists 
of two basic subsystems – production system and the control (managing, steering, regulatory, 
governance…) system. In the sequel they are simply called production and control systems. 
The control system is a part of a more general institutional framework providing the operative 
support to governance in its widest sense. The control system is that part of the most broadly 
conceived governance mechanism which relates to the economy and provides the means for 
its current and developmental regulation. The overall efficiency of the system, no matter what 
criteria for its  conceptual determination and operational measurement are adopted, clearly 
depends on the efficiency of both the production and the control systems. The conventional 
approach has been to center exclusively on the  production system and to neglect altogether 
the control system. The basic determinants of individual and organizational behavior – and 
these are clearly the  factors accounting for what people do with resources and how and why they behave in a particular way with respect to income and wealth, thus determining the 
rhythm and pattern of their expansion  –  are undoubtedly located in the control sector. 
Therefore, the  approach based exclusively on resources and technology could under no 
circumstances have been useful in diagnosing the roots of Southeasteuropean development. 
Even less could it have been useful in providing the basis for identifying the means and ways 
of initiating and successfully guiding the process of social modernization. 
A convenient way of approaching the vital and yet largely neglected institutional 
determinants of economic development and social modernization is to summarize the critical 
observations directed to neoclassical economics, mainly from the quarters of institutional 
economics and the sisterly property rights and transaction costs schools. A major point in 
these critiques is that the standard, still prevailing, neoclassical paradigm assumes away what 
is the most determinative and truly crucial. It abstracts from, or rather takes for granted, the 
complex of institutional components which induce the type of behavior relating to income, 
wealth and economic resources in general, concentrating on mechanical, technological 
relationships among economic magnitudes. One is not in the position to understand the 
mechanisms perpetuating underdevelopment and preventing progressive change if one throws 
out of his analytical purview the most powerful, perhaps the only relevant set of causative 
factors. Any theory has to abstract from a multitude of elements of secondary importance, but 
what distinguishes good from bad theories is exactly the fact that bad theories ignore the 
decisively important elements or aspects of the phenomenon under consideration.  
The truly important determinants of the long run development are certainly located in 
the control system. Development depends on what is being done with the resources and that is 
clearly the province of the control system. The control system provides managing, controlling 
and related mechanisms and instruments which account not only for the conventional static, 
i.e. allocative efficiency of the economy but also for its dynamic efficiency and growth 
potential. At least three relevant segments can be discerned within the control system. The 
first one is related to transacting across the markets, the second one to transacting within the 
firms and the third one to regulating and steering the economy as a whole, including the 
allocation of decision making authority among the economic subjects, the motivation and 
information structures (Neuberger and Duffy 1976, pp. 23-72) and, one might add, the 
character of the basic economic units themselves. This last dimension has to do with the 
design and setup of the fundamental decision-making units of the economy; they might be 
classical capitalist firms with varying legal models, or the state enterprises of the centrally 
planned socialist economies, self-managed enterprises, cooperatives… Clearly, the type of the 
basic decision-making unit is the institutional feature of an economy that greatly influences its 
efficiency and growth potential.  
From the point of view germane to this analysis the firms arise for two cumulatively 
operating reasons: firstly, there is a conspicuous and important synergy of several inputs 
cooperating together – two men can lift the stone that one single cannot – there being no 
possibility of measuring their separate contributions, and, secondly, the transaction costs of 
separate contracting with the owners of individual inputs are prohibitively high. In fact, with 
the increase of the size of the firm the costs of management and control within the firm rise 
faster and faster, while the cost of contracting across the market become relatively lower. 
Clearly implied is a margin of optimal size of the firm and the optimal division between the 
market regulated and firm regulated set of transactions, vs. relationships. When it comes 
down to explaining the reasons of slow development and to finding the ways of its 
acceleration, there are at least three things associated to the control system to be looked into: 
(1) the institutional ordering of the firm sector, particularly the character of the contractual 
arrangements within the firms determining the type of the internal motivation structure, (2) 
institutional arrangements regulating the market transactions, and (3) the division of the entire set of economic relationships and interactions into the subset regulated within the firms and 
the subset of those regulated through the market, i. e. through the inter-firm transactions. 
These are at the same time the areas of potential institutional deficiencies of the 
Southeasteuropean economies accounting for their underdevelopment and low rhythm of 
economic growth and social modernization. Namely, (1) the firms might be primitive, poorly 
organized, with contractual arrangements generating demobilizing motivation structure, (2) 
the institutional architecture regulating the workings of the market may be insufficiently 
developed, incomplete and dysfunctional, and (3) the division of the universe of economic 
relationships and business interactions between the market and the firm might be 
inappropriate. 
  2.2 Objections to Mainstream Economics as a Source of Policy Initiatives  
The ideas of the causes of underdevelopment could also, and indeed abundantly, be 
drawn from the now standard critiques of the neoclassical paradigm from the quarters of the 
institutional economics and the related areas of study. There are a number of clearly 
articulated critiques all of which are on various occasions thoroughly elaborated by S. 
Pejovich (1987, 1989, 1995). Interestingly enough, the cited sources don’t contain the same 
sets of critical objections, so that one can recognize the evolution of thought oriented to 
overcoming the established scientific stereotypes  and centered on substantiating the 
shortcoming of the prevailing paradigm. The first objection deals with neoclassical 
abstracting from  the behavioral effects of the intrafirm contractual arrangements and with an 
exclusive orientation on technological relationships. That, indeed, is a major shortcoming 
since the differences of such arrangements may lead to widely differing output on the basis of 
the same quantities of resources, so much so that some authors are inclined to incorporate the 
intrafirm relationships into the production function itself (Jovanovic 1998, p. 27). Thus, 
generally speaking, a comprehensive and realistic concept of efficiency should not remain 
irrevocably narrowed down to the conventionally conceived efficiency of the production 
system but should also take into account the effectiveness and the cost of the control system. 
The processes and the sets of processes that are very efficient in the conventional, stringently 
circumcised sense – might prove quite inefficient in the wider sense. There is an obvious 
trade-off between the two components of efficiency: considerable costs of raw materials could 
be avoided by devoting more resources and attention to judicious control and management of 
the process, and, vice versa, some costs of management and control can be avoided by a less 
parsimonious use of raw materials and other inputs. By not taking into account the costs of 
the control system, the conventional thought has made it impossible to identify the true 
alternatives of resource saving and thus to delineate the strategic directions of institutional 
change which could foster economic and social development.    
The second objection deals with resource valuation which in the neoclassical models 
is taken for granted while in the real world is only partially secured. The well known 
phenomenon of rent dissipation shows that, due to institutional reasons, some resources can 
be economically completely devalued and that potential social product, producible by such 
resources, could be irretrievably lost. A. Alchian and W. Allen (1983) have constructed their 
famous Fishlandia example (reproduced in Pejovich 1995, pp. 174-81 and Alchian 1999) in 
which the entire effect of a newly acquired boat is under some arrangements completely 
dissipated, coming down to as if no boat exists at all, while under other (private property) 
arrangements the boat finds its full economic valuation. This author has constructed a model, 
based on multi-factor Cobb-Douglas production function, in which some factors do not obtain 
their market valuation and, consequently, (1)their potential contribution to the product is lost, 
and (2) the total product is proportionally reduced in comparison to the result obtainable in a 
regime of complete valuation of the production factors. The proportionality factor depends on 
the efficiency term in the function, on the number of the non-valued factors and the elasticities of output with respect to them. The absence of institutional devices making it 
possible to value certain resources, and deficient valuation in other cases, are certainly among 
determinants of poor economic performance of the Southeasteuropean countries. 
A major, the third, deficiency of neoclassical approach, as seen through the ocular of 
neoinstitutional economics, consists in the fact that the choice set is taken for given, whereas a 
decisive factor of dynamic efficiency consists in the ability of the economy to expand it. An 
economy which learns quickly, accumulates fast economically relevant knowledge and 
speedily implements the abundant flow of innovations will probably grow much faster than an 
economy with stagnant technology and otherwise vastly superior (static) allocative efficiency 
(Pejovich 1987, pp. 462-3 and 1989, pp. 58-9). Seen as a disruption of the prevailing 
constellation of the technology, an innovation contains an implicit but decisively important 
trade-off between the conventional allocative efficiency and the size of the choice set which 
offers opportunities for major breakthroughs in output and related magnitudes. Institutional 
expedients for such speedy technological improvements are the principal component of 
dynamic efficiency and their absence is a possible, and even likely, reason for 
underdevelopment. The trouble with the neoclassical parable is in that it deals  with 
innovations only after the  fact, once they are already adopted (Pejovich 1987, p. 463 and 
1989, p. 58), while institutions fostering innovations and growth of knowledge represent some 
of the most powerful promoters of development. Again, the sources of growth are to be 
sought in an area which is assumed away in the neoclassical analysis. 
A frequently voiced critique, the fourth one in order, of neoclassical theory is centered 
on its treatment of the firm as a black box (Pejovich 1995, p. 174). The firm is given a sort of 
the will of its own. It is only people that have will and take decisions. Without taking into 
account the motivation structure within the firm and the way the individuals respond to 
various stimuli, the responses of the firm to exogenous changes cannot be understood and 
some important possibilities of development inducing changes might go unnoticed. This 
argument in fact goes down to the importance of the contractual arrangements within the firm 
and to their contribution to the overall efficiency of the economy. 
To summarize, the truly important factors of failed and/or currently slow development 
are contained in the control system, the one providing the managerial impulses and control 
services, the system whose contribution a nd the costs (transaction costs) have in the 
mainstream theory been largely ignored. Enumeration of these factors will be helpful. Firstly, 
production function should not reflect just the technological ties but also the intrafirm 
contractual arrangements. Some of these arrangements, when tied to the absence of valuation 
of resources, or to their inadequate valuation, could completely or partially devalue and thus 
in the economic sense annihilate a part of existing national wealth. Secondly, to arrive at a 
true perception of the overall economic efficiency, along with the usual costs and effects of 
the production system, one has to take into account the  contribution and the costs of the 
control system. Ignoring the control system, particularly the transaction costs, one looses sight 
of the changes in institutions which can pave the way to economic growth and social 
development.  Thirdly the choice set cannot be taken as given nor can its expansion be 
incorporated into analysis only after innovations are implemented; the really high priority is 
to explain, i. e. endogenize the flow of innovations and understand its immense contribution 
to the development potential of the economy.  Fourthly, the firm does not have its own 
conscience nor does it posses its own will; it is the individuals in and around the firm that take 
decisions and account for the firm’s behavior. The gains in productivity are not a matter of 
specialization of independent organizations but result from the successful internal contracting 
among the organization’s members. 
The critique of the neoclassical school is reviewed here not because of the conviction 
that it spells out the definitive scientific truths but because it serves well as a source of inspiration regarding the factors of underdevelopment. It is also a fruitful source of 
hypotheses regarding the levers of development policy capable of producing the needed 
turnaround and subsequently maintaining the economy on the trajectory of stable and 
sustainable development. Thus, in its extreme form the neoinstitutional critique goes as far as 
to ignore and deny the impact of the existing technology, whereas the utilized techniques and 
knowledge incorporated in them are certainly among the factors accounting for the observed 
differences in performance. It is easy to imagine economies with identical all elements 
(resources, tastes, location…) except technology and find differences in output directly related 
to differences in applied techniques. After all, no two processes with identical technology can 
be found and in every applied technical solution there is an inevitable stochastic element 
caused by the idiosyncrasies of place and time. An uncompromising rejection of the firm as a 
black box seems also to be a form of scientific extremism which is hard  to perceive as  
warranted. Not infrequently one is in the position to observe conflicts between the firms in 
which they behave as conscious entities with strong and monolithic will, while in other types 
of behavior it seems to be possible and even convenient to approximate their response 
patterns by treating them as endowed with will and passion. One should not forget that the 
empirical models based on the neoclassical theory went a long way in explaining economic 
realities and that econometric specifications deriving from neoclassical relationships 
displayed significant explanatory power.  
In defense of neoclassical analysis one might add that it could represent a good 
approximation of economic relationships not only in situations in which the transaction costs 
are low but also in a much wider class of situations in which they exhibit a fairly high 
correlation with the production costs. No one can deny the fact that the neoclassical analysis 
has long served and still serves as a rich source of analytical tools without which other 
schools, including the neoinstitutional, could hardly operate and produce their own analytical 
insights. Another important point to note is that the neoinstitutionalism and the related schools 
are not that fundamentally different from the neoclassical paradigm: both fundamentally rely 
on the truly basic maximizing archetype as a manner of articulating the presumed all-
pervading human rationality (Bates 1995, pp. 41-4; Toye 1995, pp. 66-7 and, particularly 
Stein 1995, p. 124, noting explicitly that neoinstitutionalism does not fundamentally challenge 
the mainstream thinking in Economics). In both paradigms it is the rationality that accounts 
for the observed or presumed outcomes of human interaction. Different are only the setups 
and the conditions under which the rationality, taken for granted by both approaches, comes 
to the fore. One could also defend the neoclassical school for its immense educational 
performance: all those who advocate its epochal demise have learned their analytics and 
modes of reasoning from neoclassical (text)books. After all, before learning how to run one 
certainly has to learn how to walk. 
Despite the reluctance to go along fully with the neoinstitutional and related critiques 
of the neoclassical theory, they do represent a rich source of ideas about the determinants of 
the present, far from satisfactory, state of Southeasteuropean economies and societies and a 
convenient indicator as to the possible solutions of their endemic modernization obstacles. 
One is really in the position to review a rich panoply of policy options against the backdrop of 
what new approaches to development have revealed as lacking in the mainstream economics. 
  2.3 Institutions and Behavior – A Preliminary Elaboration 
Not surprisingly, institutions are defined in various ways, but, perhaps surprisingly,  
the alternative definitions very much converge to the same semantic core. Thus, North 
(1995/1990/, 3) defines institutions as the rules of the societal game, or, more formally as 
“…the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. Institutions, of course, 
relate to individuals, but even more so to variously structured organizations and North (p. 5) 
quite appropriately defines organizations as the “groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives”. The principal purpose of institutions is to provide 
structure to the rich interplay of human ventures and actions, to provide a coordinating 
framework to varying human endeavors and thus to reduce the uncertainty in economic and 
social life. Lukic (1988, p. 397) defines an institution as a set of legal norms concerning a 
given social relation or a quantitatively limited collection of such relations, whereby the 
norms rest on the same basic principles and could as a rule be classified into broader 
categories of institutions pertaining to differing levels of social hierarchy. Thus there are 
higher and lower rank institutions: e. g. the institution of marriage is a member of the broader 
class of the institution of contracts, whereas the latter class belongs to a still wider category of 
legal acts. One is struck by the narrowness of this definition: it encompasses only the formal, 
legal acts and leaves out the informal behavioral standards, such as ethical norms and 
customary rules in general. For the purposes of this analysis the most convenient will be a 
slight modification of a definition provided by Pejovich (1995, p. 30): the institutions 
represent a set of legal, administrative, ethically based and customary arrangements to 
coordinate, order and streamline the repeated human interactions. Crucially important is the 
fact that institutions, by contributing to coordination of actions of independent 
decisionmakers, reduce what Neuberger and Duffy (1976, p. 25) call endogenous or systemic 
uncertainty. It is also apposite to note that repeated interactions are pointed out as the area of 
activity that is being coordinated by institutions. That means that not all interactions are 
being coordinated in this way, but just those which occur with sufficient frequency.  
Creating institutions is not a costless exercise and, as a matter of general principle, 
institutions arise if and when their effects, the contribution they make in various ways to 
social product or other socially valued factors, exceed their costs. That also means that a lot of 
interactions, those occurring with insufficient frequency, will not be regulated institutionally 
but in some other way or not at all. It seems that the reasoning developed by Barzel 
(1997/1989/, chs. 6 and 8) on the formation of property rights could be extended in a 
straightforward way to the institutions in general. Worth of note is the fact that this broader 
definition encompasses both formal (legal and other statutory arrangements) and informal 
rules of game. Formal rules are statutory regulations and define the political system (the 
hierarchical allocation of authority, the collection of decision-making prerogatives, the civil 
liberties and human rights), the economic system (property rights and contracts), and the 
protection system (judiciary, police, military) (cf. Pejovich 1995, p. 31). 
Institutions define the set of social actors – including, of course, the set of economic 
agents (what could be called the organization structure)  –, the allocation over actors of 
decision making authority, including the set of inalienable individual rights (the decision-
making structure), the motivation or incentive structure for decision-making and the 
information structure for making decisions (cf. Neuberger and Duffy 1976, pp. 23-72 for a 
somewhat different taxonomy). All four components are important and are multiply 
interrelated. The features of the actors merge into the general groundwork of their behavior, 
the allocation of decision-making authority defines the constraints within which the actions of 
various actors have to be located, the motivation structure determines the strength and the 
desired direction of these actions and the information structure provides (some of) the 
cognitive inputs for these actions. The key element in any institutional structure is the 
individual freedom  – the untouchable area which cannot be intruded into under any 
circumstances (Hayek 1998/1972/, ch. 1, particularly pp. 19-21) – because it fundamentally 
affects the set  of ventures and all other kinds of actions that a society is capable of 
undertaking and thus features as a general determinant of the most widely conceived 
mobilizing power of any society.  
Among various kinds of freedom the most important from the point of view of this 
analysis is certainly the set of  economic freedoms (cf. Lewis 1955, pp. 78-101) which are basic for the ability of a society to accumulate the economically relevant knowledge and thus 
to achieve and maintain a high rate of technical progress as a key to the stable, lasting and 
sufficiently rapid economic development. Among the dimensions of economic freedom Lewis 
particularly emphasized the scope of individual vs. collective action, as the latter, while 
facilitating certain societal tasks and being irreplaceable for some such duties, seriously 
constrains the total quantity of operations that can be performed in a society and at the same 
time greatly dilutes the motivation for these operations. He also strongly stresses vertical 
mobility and the freedom of markets, i. e. the degree to which the space is provided for 
unobstructed making of economic transactions. The central role in this context is played by 
the ownership rights which can be interpreted as the embodiment of a set of crucially 
important freedoms – the freedom to posses, to commit what belongs to somebody to a wide 
range of entrepreneurial ventures, to use what one possesses and to reap the fruits of what 
belongs to someone. It is understood that all these prerogatives are within the limits of law. 
Another thing to note is the fact that the ownership rights are not only the institutionalized 
forms of freedom, but are at the same time the material basis for a wide array of freedoms in 
other areas of life. The first test of the progressiveness and the social rationality of a given set 
of institutions is the degree to which they provide for various freedoms and guarantee their 
maintenance. 
The ownership rights play a key role in all the above mentioned dimensions of the 
institutional framework. It is up to the owners to decide in what form they will combine and 
organize their resources including the manner of combining resources which belong to 
different owners. Such multiply owned collections of resources are institutionally formalized 
as various types of companies (Vasiljevic 1999, pp.9-17). The institution of ownership is also 
known to be the principal source of decision-making power in the market economies – the 
prerogatives to direct and control have either the owners themselves or the persons 
empowered by them. The rights contained in the bundle of ownership undoubtedly constitute  
the set of the strongest ever created incentive devices because it is only the ownership that 
establishes direct connection between the authority to decide, including the actual acts of 
decision-making, and the consequences of decisions. With clearly defined ownership rights 
the consequences fall exactly on the loci of the decision-making, which implies that rewards 
are closely tied with efforts and the resulting productivity (cf. Lewis 1955, pp. 57-69) and also 
that the risk ultimately falls on the property of those who decide. The latter feature could be 
termed a rational institutionalization of risk.  
At last, ownership appears to be of crucial significance even in the constitution of the 
information structure. The reasoning here is a little more subtle. The purpose of the 
information structure is to provide signals as to what economic alternatives are the most 
attractive from the point of view of the individual decision-maker and, by certain chains of 
implication, from the standpoint of the society at large. Such informational signals are 
provided not by any set of prices but only by the set of competitive prices. To have the right 
prices, one has to have competition. On the other hand, competition is possible only if there is 
sufficiently strong motivation for competition and such motivation can only be secured by 
clearly defined and effectively protected private ownership rights. (The detailed elaboration of 
the relevant arguments is contained in Lavoie 1985 and is presented in a less sophisticated 
way but much earlier by Hayek 1980/1948/, ch. VI, von Mises 1950/1935/ and Hoff 
1981/1949/). The above reasoning should make it apparent that properly articulated rights of 
private ownership, exerting their influence through competition come out not as a sufficient 
but just as a necessary condition for getting the right prices as signaling devices leading to an 
efficient allocation of economic resources.  
Important elements of the overall organization of the society are the organizations in 
the narrow, technical sense of the word. The latter, despite the fact that they are frequently referred to as institutions  are, as pointed out earlier in this section, properly defined by North 
(1995/1990/, p. 5) as the groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve 
objectives. North (p.7) perceives a permanent interaction between institutions and 
organizations. Organizations arise as a response to opportunities created by institutions and 
contribute greatly to the directions and speed of institutional change. Institutions in turn 
determine the scope for development of organizations and, in particular, the change of their 
forms and the unfolding of their legal formalization. As noted above, the forms of 
organizations have themselves to be taken as one of the dimensions of the institutional order. 
They are a major determinant of the costs of the control system, but are, at the same time, 
simultaneously – and, indeed, to a large extent – determined by these costs. These costs 
obviously influence the other three features of the control system as well. But, contrary to 
what is asserted by North (1995/1990/, p. 12), one could not say that institutions matter (only) 
when it is costly to transact. The Alchian’s (1999) Fishlandia example, commented on in the 
previous section, clearly shows that, under assumption of zero transaction costs, alternative 
institutional arrangements produce vastly differing allocational outcomes. Thus, private 
property rights lead to the maximization of the social product, whereas their absence  leads to 
the rent dissipation. A way of acquiescing to the North’s assertion could perhaps be to 
postulate that the private property rights themselves could be introduced only at a cost and 
next to treat these costs as a component of the transaction costs. This rather contrived manner 
is not particularly appealing from a pragmatic point of view. The other North’s assertion 
about institutions not being necessary  in a world of complete information also seems to be 
contradicted by the Fishlandia example in which differing arrangements produce glaringly 
different outcomes in an environment of complete certainty.  
  2.4 Institutional Ordering of the Complementary Spheres of Social Life  
The life of a society can be segmented into several large and largely non-overlapping 
spheres which exhaust all of the society’s major functions. The term largely non-overlapping 
is intended to convey the idea that the spheres are not completely disjunct, but that certain 
nonempty intersections among them don’t blur their basically clear and unequivocal 
demarcation. These areas partly coincide and logically derive from a number of fundamental 
human (collections of) rights and freedoms and partly derive from some standard 
interrelationships which are regularly established among the humans and are a lasting part of 
their daily existence. The area of human rights and freedoms is rapidly evolving and 
continually changing so that it is rather difficult to provide a transparent and selfimposing 
classification. As one settles for a satisfactory – at least to some extent – classification, new 
items appear for which not a convenient pigeonhole can be found in some obvious way. It 
becomes possible and apposite even to speak about various vintages of human rights: Pihler 
(1999, p. 260) recently identified four generations of such rights. Individual rights and 
freedoms are predictably emphasized the basic rights, but one also notices that collective 
rights are more and more frequently mentioned. The distinction between the positive and 
negative rights is another relative novelty in the treatment of the human freedoms. Collective 
and, in particular, positive rights are not always easy to conceptualize. The first ones are in 
some instances difficult to conceive because the individuals are, to paraphrase Buchanan 
(1977, pp. 14-5), natural units of consciousness and, indeed, the unique and nonsubstitutable 
“sources of value” (Buchanan 1985, pp. 249-51). The  second ones are even harder to 
incorporate into a coherent system of rights because they imply satisfaction of some 
categories of needs for which no resources may turn out to be  available, thus further implying 
the need for coercive expropriation of those who have created the corresponding economic 
values. Yet, it is evident that a large number of persons may happen to be – as far as some 
dimensions of social status are concerned – in the same situation and that both their needs and 
their rights can coincide in that dimension. As for the positive rights, one could perhaps refer to the idea of the social contract and the Rawlsian (1997/1971/, pp. 12, 19, 136-42) veil of 
ignorance, with the idea that, confronted with an uncertain future, the rational individuals will 
agree to define a level of standard below which no citizen will be allowed to fall. It must be 
admitted that various “economic”, “social”, “cultural” and similar rights are not coherently 
spelled out, no practical and feasible way of their fulfillment has been articulated and one is 
forced to conclude that, more frequently than not, one is unable to incorporate them into an 
architecture or rights that would have firm logical and functional foundations. Small wonder 
that the authors specialized in such rights and indoctrinated with the message contained in 
them gloomily state that these rights are just articulated in a declaratory manner and that the 
governmental obligations related to their realization are not specified (Pajvancic 1999, pp. 40, 
47). In any case, despite numerous logically untenable and practically unimplementable 
rights, the number and scope of rights permanently expands and citizens are less and less 
treated as “subjects” and more and more as emancipated members of community which is 
democratically run and where the question of rights is fundamental to shaping its organization 
and its institutional order. 
With all these caveats and, in particular, with awareness that some rights shade into 
unclear and ill-specified categories, one could perhaps delineate seven large areas of rights, 
freedoms and normatively defined interpersonal relationships. They are simultaneously the 
areas of institutional ordering and sustained development of institutional arrangements. The 
areas are (1) the right to life and protection of life and limb as well as the elementary security 
of persons, (2) the right to personal freedom encompassing a number of derived individual 
rights, (3) the right to safeguarding human dignity and self-esteem, (4) the right to own 
material and other economically relevant resources formalized by what is known as the 
collection of property rights, (5) the right to participate in the collective decision making 
operationalized through the well-known political rights, (6) a rich and versatile conglomerate 
of interpersonal relations and corresponding rights embodied in them, such as marital and 
parental rights and obligations, and, lastly, (7) the set of economic, social, cultural and similar 
“rights” for which it is not always certain that they represent rights in the strict sense of the 
world. 
Area (1) contains what Hayek (1998/1972/, p. 26) has formulated as the legal status of 
a protected citizen whose right to protection derives simply from his being the member of the 
community. This set of rights includes the right to be protected from all forms of violence, in 
particular the governmental violence in the form of maltreatment carrying the danger of 
corporal damage. Protected is not only physical but also psychic integrity of a person. 
Prohibition or torture, rape, experiment in vivo and similar assaults on body and psyche is 
implied. Area (2) includes first of all the immunity against arbitrary arrests the right to 
privacy and the right to protection against any unauthorized intrusion i nto the sphere of 
strictly personal affairs. The right to protection against the unnatural sexual treatment and 
rape is included into this collection. The same goes for the right to protect all kinds of 
personal information which does not affect other persons. The prohibition of some forms of 
discrimination and unequal treatment before the law could perhaps be classified into this 
group. Area (3) includes the right to fair and dignified treatment in all dealings with the 
governmental agencies, particularly  those authorized to apply the coercive measures. Some 
components of the right to privacy and the prohibition of some forms of sexual violence could 
conveniently be classified into this category. Ban on all forms of humiliating punishment also 
belongs here. The next segment, termed area (4), consists of the well known property rights, 
which Pejovich (1995, p. 65) cogently defined as the rules formalizing the relations among 
individuals arising from the existence of scarce goods and the need to allocate them in view of 
competing needs. These rights first of all pertain to the protection of private ownership, as its 
legal protection logically and functionally enters the very definition of ownership; unprotected ownership ceases simply to be ownership (Madzar 1992, especially p. 458). Offering 
possibilities to conclude a multitude of extremely variegated contracts, providing legal 
provisions where the contracts fail to specify fully the relationships between the parties and, 
in particular, protecting the contracts and ensuring their implementation is one of the key 
components of property rights as just defined. Some authors postulate the right to 
entrepreneurship and analogous economic initiatives (Stankovic 1999) and it is apparent that 
such rights should be included into this category. More generally, the right to chose the jobs 
as one finds fit, together with pursuing whatever activities one chooses without stepping 
outside the law, as well as, even more generally, all rights embodied into the right of 
ownership, clearly belong to this bundle of rights. The inheritance rights, too, belong to this 
bundle.  The broad segment of rights designated as area (5) encompasses the usual active and 
passive electoral rights (i. e. the right to vote and to run for public offices), the rights to 
petition, public gatherings, political initiatives, organized protests and the right to be 
accurately informed on political and other relevant events. The freedom of conscience, 
conviction, thought, beliefs (religious and otherwise) and expression of one’s own culture in 
the language of his choice undoubtedly belong here. One could classify here the right to turn 
to various international organizations for the protection of legally formalized human rights. 
The protection against discrimination and unequal treatment in universally and non-
selectively formalized legal procedures is mainly to be classified under this heading. The 
rights (and obligations) grouped under the heading (6) don’t call for additional comments, 
except that the sphere of the legal regulations, as opposed to free contractual stipulations, is in 
this field perhaps relatively bigger than in most other areas. Area (7) doesn’t call for 
additional comments either, but one should perhaps point to the fact that it could be, and 
usually is, covered with a dense network of institutional arrangements even though most items 
in this category could not qualify as the rights in the strict sense of the term. 
Seven described areas are intended to cover the entirety of human life – above all the 
life of the individual, but at the same time the vast area of the complete social life, through 
endless and impossible to enumerate interactions with other individuals. The institutional 
scaffolding of a society is equally immense as it covers the enumerated areas and countless 
interactions proceeding within and among them. Each area has its specific institutions and 
there are institutions straddling two or more areas, as well as those binding the entire society 
into a unique functional whole. But, for institutions which are primarily tied to certain well 
specified areas – and such are the most numerous – it is important to recognize where they 
belong and what their primary functions are. One, for instance, could not go along with 
Pejovich (1995, p. 65) in asserting that the right to vote is a property right, with an attempt to 
justify this by the statement that it would be wrong to separate the property rights from human 
rights. It is true that property rights cannot be separated from the human rights because the 
former are a subset of the latter, but that is certainly not the reason to identify the rights from 
another area of human rights with the property rights themselves. Property rights occupy the 
entire area 4, while the right to vote belongs to area 5 in the above described taxonomy. 
Institutions are largely specialized, but they are also interdependent. As will be 
revealed in the sequel, the widest and the most comprehensive definition of institutions is 
adopted here. As opposed to approach taken by Lukic (1988, p. 397), who narrows down 
institutions to just the set of written, legally formalized rules, the approach adopted here 
follows that taken by Pejovich (1995, p.30) and North (1995/1990/, pp. 3, 6) in conceiving 
institutions as the set of  both formal  and informal rules regulating those components of 
human behavior which consist in more or less regular, repeated interactions. The written, 
legally formalized rules are just the tip of an iceberg, a small part of an incomparably larger 
set of r ules, the vast majority of which are informal and  not legally sanctioned. While 
accepting the informal rules as a major portion of the institutional superstructure of any society – without such an approach it would be impossible to explain the repeated failures to 
transplant laws and constitutions of the advanced countries into civilizationally less developed 
environments – the further classification of rules will be different from those that are followed 
by other authors.  
Along with recognizing that most  institutions belong to well specified areas, it is 
equally important to take cognizance of their fundamental complementarity and of the fact 
that they mutually support, or fail to support, each other. That should come as no surprise. As 
far as formally enacted, legally formalized rules are concerned, they come out of the same 
parliamentary and legislative machinery and it is only natural that they exhibit certain 
common characteristics. As for the informal rules, they come out of the same set of mores, the 
same culture and, again, some easily recognizable common traits are only to be expected. 
Complementarity means, among other things, that the failure for institutions to be established 
firmly and the rights to be protected in one area endangers the realization of rights in another: 
the inadequate protection of life clearly endangers full realization of property or political 
rights and the lack of political rights and freedoms is an unequivocal danger for property 
rights and personal security. And so on. The rights and freedoms in practically all enumerated 
areas, particularly those in which they can be unambiguously defined, are interdependent in 
the sense that their full realization presupposes the realization of several bundles of rights in 
other areas. Even though an all-out attempt to upgrade all rights simultaneously is dangerous 
because societies don’t have sufficient knowledge and information for such an overextended 
engineering, the isolated ventures to promote just some isolated areas of rights are, on the 
sheer account of their interdependence, even more hazardous.  
  2.5 Formal and informal Constraints: Ethical Norms  
Institutions, viewed as the rules regulating human behavior, are operationalized 
through various kinds of norms. Following Lukic (1988, p. 201), but departing from his 
narrow concept of institutions as only those rules which are legally formalized and backed by 
the state’s coercive apparatus, the norms are defined here as the rules regulating human 
behavior and accompanied by the sanctions of one form or another. The sanctions can be 
legally established or else they can emanate from some sort of more or less clearly expressed 
social pressure. As indicated in the title of this section, the basic classification of norms is into 
formal and i nformal. The formal norms are the legal norms. Informal norms are further 
subdivided into ethical (moral) and customary norms. This subdivision is important as it 
delineates two clear-cut categories of norms. E.g., the prohibition of incest could never be 
qualified as just customary nor would this adjective be appropriate. It will be shown in the 
sequel that ethical norms have much deeper roots. On the other hand, there is nothing 
profoundly or otherwise moral in the customs of countless settlements to have regular yearly, 
quarterly or otherwise fairs or celebrations. These norms, too, help coordinating human 
actions, economic or non-economic. 
Lukic (1988, pp. 201-20) has provided a careful and detailed analysis of legal norms. 
His analysis can easily be extended and suitably modified so as to apply to informal – moral 
and customary – norms as well. The norms are generally divided into two components: the 
disposition and the sanction. The disposition is the precept for a well-defined form of 
behavior. It is usually conditional and contains two elements: the hypothesis of the disposition 
and the command as to how to behave. The command is valid only if the hypothesis is 
fulfilled and holds true. The sanction also contains two elements – the hypothesis and the 
measure to be applied. The hypothesis of the sanction is the failure to follow the command or 
to acquiesce with the prohibition contained in the disposition. Such failure is called the delict. 
The meaning of the norm comes down to putting an actor into the situation of having to chose 
either to obey the norm or to suffer the consequences. Some norms are unconditional and 
apply universally; their disposition then consists of only one element. The example of such a norm would be the obligation of all citizens to obey the constitution and the laws of the 
country. The example of the standard, conditional norm would be the duty of any citizen 
whose income exceeds a certain amount to pay taxes and the threat to suffer prescribed 
punishment if he doesn’t oblige. The hypothesis of the disposition is an income in excess of a 
prescribed amount, the command is to pay taxes, the hypothesis of the sanction is the failure 
to pay taxes and the sanction is the punishment prescribed by the law.  
In view of the identical structure of the disposition and the sanction, the sanction can 
be interpreted as a sort of secondary disposition: if the primary disposition is not obeyed – i. 
e., if the hypothesis of the sanction is fulfilled – there follows the punishment. Some sanctions 
are administered by the government and some are performed by the corresponding actor 
himself. One who has violated the traffic rules is most likely to pay fine of his own free will 
(the second case); if not, the government will find way to collect the money by force and it 
will cost him more (the first case). Such punishments as death penalty are administered by the 
state. Regarding their content and substance the dispositions can be either commands 
(“parents are obliged to raise and educate their children”), prohibitions (“one may not take 
other people’s property”) or empowering (“citizens are entitled to protection of their 
property”). Viewed as devices ordering bilateral relations the norms empower one (X claims 
money for the house he sold to Y) and define the duty for another actor (Y is under obligation 
to pay money for the house bought from X). Some dispositions can themselves be dispositive: 
the parties have, within the limits of the law, the freedom to arrange their relation they find fit, 
but if they don’t make use of this advantage, the legal provisions will apply. Some norms are 
formed on the basis of what is called legal standards: such are injunctions to behave like a 
good pater familias or to behave in accordance with public morality. The agents who are 
obliged by the norm may have the choice from among several ways of fulfilling their duties. 
The scope for choice may have also those who define the obligations for other agents. Clearly, 
the latter position is the one of power, while the former is far from it. Discretionary power is 
associated to the latter position, while one could speak of the dispositive dispositions in 
connection with the former. Occasionally, the sanctions take on a dispositive form, too: the 
actor is in the position to chose from among alternative ways of being punished. 
The norms naturally fit into a hierarchical structure. There are norms of differing 
degree of generality, starting with very narrow and specific norms and ending with the norms 
of utmost generality. Specific norms bundle together into the more general norms, 
hierarchical layers of norms are formed in the obvious way and, in the end, all norms merge 
into a magnificent whole represented by the legal order, i.e. moral order or order of customary 
regulations. The norms are generated by legal acts which also fall into hierarchical structure, 
the acts of the higher order providing the framework and representing the sources of the acts 
of the lower order. Thus, one finds a bewildering multiplicity of legal acts, starting with 
constitution as the highest, going through the laws of varying generality and significance and 
ending with the countless number and variety of contracts and various bylaws, including those 
which in fact represent the internal legislation of business and other organizations. A similar 
though far less succinctly ordered pyramidal structure can be observed on the set of ethical 
and customary norms.  
As opposed to legal norms, ethical (moral) norms evidently imply a series of serious 
acts of evaluation of the behavior of our fellow-citizens and, in particular, an uninterrupted 
series of acts of self-evaluation. Ethical norms, similar to the legal norms, generally involve 
disposition and sanction. Disposition commands that under certain conditions (the hypothesis) 
certain things must be or may not be done (the precept taking the form of order or 
prohibition). If the disposition is not obeyed, the sanction follows. In this case the sanction is 
not exclusively imposed from outside, but can take the form of self-imposed punishment. As 
for the outside sanctions, they are most frequently imposed in the form of disapproval and contempt, but the acts of violence and physical maltreatment are not excluded. The self-
imposed sanctions are in the form of bad conscience or remorse. While recognizing that the 
moral rules are the norms of behavior, Lukic (1982, pp. 100-2) denies them the property of 
constituting a part of the institutional order. As indicated above, the opposite approach is 
adopted here. Lukic (1982, p. 104) observes that the morals are best recognized by self-
prescribed and self-imposed duties which frequently run against the deep-seated natural 
instincts and urge. 
 Ethical norms are firmly tied to the notion of good and evil, which is one of the 
elemental features distinguishing man from other forms of life. The most effective in this 
context appears to be the abstract determination of the notion of good. It could and perhaps 
should run along the lines of the Kantian categorical imperative: the concept of good is 
implied in the behavior following the principles and rules which could be adopted as 
generalized, universal norms of behavior. The concrete substance of the good behavior does 
not acquire particular significance: the thing that matters is not what acts and deeds should 
constitute good behavior but how it is determined, on the basis of what principles it is derived. 
Ethical norms are then the components of the categorical imperative imposed by reason. 
Moral thus boils down to an unconditional order to do good for the sake of good itself, 
without any traces of instrumental motivation. No justification is needed for the moral outside 
the ultimate ethical order itself. Moral norms are self-justifying. Internal ethical coercion is 
the principal reason for moral behavior. The Kantian notion of moral is partly opposed and 
partly supplemented by the conceptual architecture effected by Durkheim who added the 
external pressure to the set of forces accounting for the observance of ethical norms. In this 
modified and combined optic, moral would be both autonomous (self-imposed and depending 
on internal imperatives) and heteronomous (imposed by the society as well and relying for its 
observance on social ostracism). Some authors speak about the social processes of 
interiorization whereby the externally imposed norms become embraced by conscience and 
self-discipline and the heteronomous character of the moral gradually takes on autonomous 
marks. This eclectic, synthesizing approach finds two distinct roots of the moral norms: one in 
the disinterested individual himself who consciously opts for the elevated and abstract notion 
of the good, and another in the society which in various ways imposes good behavior and 
perhaps instrumentalizes, in all likelihood indirectly, ethical norms in its very survival.  
In a very long and extensively elaborated list of internal – i. e. autonomous and self-
imposed – and external  – i. e. heteronomous and imposed by the society  – distinguishing 
features, Lukic elaborates the basic tenets of  moral norms which unambiguously set them 
apart from other, legal and customary norms. Among the internal features, i.e. the elements of 
self-imposed obligatoriness of the ethical norms, Lukic (1982, pp. 110-8) identifies (1) the 
lack of how ever conceived conditionality, i. e. the categorical and absolute character of these 
norms, (2) the fact that they incorporate values and ultimately reduce to value judgments, (3) 
the acceptance of  good as the supreme moral value, (4) the existence of a  special moral 
sentiment, (5) the instantaneous activation of the moral urge, (6) the pressure on the inferior 
part of human nature in the sense of opting for choices which run contrary to some basic 
instincts, (7) the fundamental humanity of the norms distinguishing man from other forms of 
life and (8) remorse as a sanction for the failure to follow the commands contained in the 
norms. The conspicuous characteristic of the moral norms, referred to above, is their 
heteronomy which coexists with their just elaborated autonomy. They are not just a matter of 
the unilateral and uninduced opting for the abstract idea of  good and the corresponding 
operationalization of that noble choice through practical action but also a sphere of social 
pressure and informal coercion to behave in the socially approved ways. The heteronomy of 
these norms derives from moral sanctions which Lukic (1982, p. 119) divides into specific 
and non-specific. Specific sanctions are moral contempt, defined as a very strong disapproval of given acts combined w ith the negation of basic human qualities on the part of the 
delinquent, and moral disgust defined as an extreme feeling of unease on the occasion of such 
acts. The non-specific sanctions, frequently caused by the specific ones, comprise the 
avoidance of any relationships with the perpetrator and even ostracism. The public expression 
of contempt and disapproval as well as attacks on life, limb and property also belong to the 
non-specific sanctions. 
A last remark, which for lack of space will be just briefly outlined, concerns the 
purported rootedness of ethical norms in reason. In a comprehensive and imaginative 
elaboration Hayek (1990/1988/, ch. 1) analyzes what he calls the cultural evolution in which 
the ethical component plays the central role. The evolution of morals and culture Hayek sees 
as a decisive way in which the destiny of the societies is being shaped through the suitable 
adjustments to the changes in the environment. It is these adjustments that, in Hayek’s vision, 
determine the fate of the societies and civilizations, and the development of reason comes 
about as a consequence of this more basic process. It is to be noted that the functional and, to 
some extent, causal relation. conventionally believed to hold true, is diametrically reversed: it 
is not the reason that generates the ethical standards and norms but the other way around. 
2.6 Further Considerations of Informal Constraints: Customary Constraints and 
    Societal Culture 
The customary norms are largely non-sanctioned and spontaneously  created. The 
countless decisions of the bewildering number of decision-makers can only give the expected, 
objectively realizable effects if they are to some degree coordinated. As a matter of principle, 
the effects of any decision depend on the decisions taken by the same actor before and, even 
more so, on the currently and previously taken decisions of other actors. It is not possible to 
assemble information on such a large number of decisions of other actors and even on the 
own decisions of a given agent. The informal constraints automatically and necessarily arise 
as a means of coordinating such a large number of decisions, absent the capacity to take them 
into account directly. The informal rules arise with the property that, if all concerned follow 
their precepts, their decisions will be reasonably or at least tolerably coordinated. Formalized, 
legal rules have, of course, the same effects, but for a number of reasons legal formalization is 
costly and in many instances not even feasible. It is probably t rue that, with written and 
formalized rules amounting to some kind of capital requiring resources and formal knowledge 
to be created, the informal rules are relatively more frequent in less developed countries. 
However, their frequency and significance in developed countries should not be neglected: as 
Macalay (1996) demonstrates with impressive documentary evidence, statutes and other 
formal rules are just sparsely strewn islands in the ocean of informal arrangements which 
usually arise in the course of long lasting business relationships. These unwritten and 
unformalized agreements display tremendous versatility and are properly known only to those 
who have formed them and use them on a daily basis. The exact way in which the rules 
manage to coordinate decisions is not easy to decipher, but following some common recipes 
or formulas seems to have significant coordinating power. One does not have to assume that 
all situations automatically and unavoidably generate rules sufficiently efficient in 
coordinating  the decisions  – we are perhaps in the position to observe only those 
constellations in which the appearance of such rules did happen; other constellations have 
vanished and are out of our universe. 
The other important aspect of the evolving of informal rules is the limited capacity of 
the decision-makers to identify the really good decisions. The first limitation is their modest 
cognitive capacity; the world is unbelievably complex and our ability to come to grips with it 
is modest if not negligible. Also limited is the capacity to collect and store information, as 
well as the capacity for its retrieval. To be effectively used, information has quite frequently 
to be transferred and the capacity of the communication channels is clearly limited. What to say about the limited and occasionally more than inadequate algorithmic capacity? With all 
necessary information assembled and computing devices ready, we may find ourselves in the 
situation of not knowing how to proceed and what to do  with it. These are also the reasons 
because of which some commonly observed rules might spontaneously arise simply to 
alleviate the cognitive, informational and algorithmic difficulties which could otherwise prove 
prohibitive. The (common) rules provide shortcuts and reduce the dimensions and the size of 
the really hard, not infrequently insurmountable problems that otherwise would have to be 
confronted. The Hayekian ideas of catallaxy (1990/1988/, pp. 98, 112) and spontaneous order 
(passim) could evidently be of help here. Spontaneous order does not have to arise under all 
circumstances and one should never forget that the spontaneous disorder is also an obvious 
possibility (Buchanan 1977, ch. 2, particularly pp. 27-30), but there evidently exist rules 
which generate both order and disorder. Even if rules generating order arise, there is no 
guarantee that they will be efficient (North 1995/1990/, pp. 7, 14, 44-5, 51-2). However, the 
verdict of (in)efficiency evidently depends on the criterion adopted, but the very survival of 
constellations based on institutions proclaimed to be inefficient must somehow speak in favor 
of them. Configurations with small sets of players could perhaps – and, indeed, under strictly 
framed assumptions – be  coordinated by each player attempting to act on the predictions of 
what other players will do in the course of the game, but as the number of players increases 
there seems to be no alternative to the Hayekian construct. 
The truly significant contribution of the neoinstitutional theories is the recognition that 
individuals and their organizations may continually operate with grossly inadequate, in many 
respects distorted models. No theory can be satisfactory in the utmost important operational 
sense if it takes no account of what, as a matter of principle, seems to be the most limited 
thing in daily doings of social agents: our knowledge and understanding and even our ability 
to learn. Pejovich, North and multitude of other authors rightly insist upon the fact that 
decision-makers’ perception of the world more often than not is highly imperfect and that one 
can not confidently expect even the existence of a feedback through which their models of 
world would be persistently improved. We may be born dumb and in the same state terminate 
our lives. A Serbian saying has it: the young is mad and the old is stupid. This is why 
established patterns of thought, the conventional models and the stereotypes arise. There is a 
clear parallel between institutions and the standard, conventional cognitive forms: institutions 
facilitate coordination, economize on information processing and decision-making and thus  
streamline the behavior of independent agents. Cognitive stereotypes economize on the 
cognitive efforts and costs and substitute a ready-made, if erroneous, picture for a more 
realistic representation which can only be arrived at after a painstaking delving into the 
intricacies of surrounding realities of a complex universe. This is also where ideology  – 
defined long ago by Marx as false consciousness, despite its being not unavoidably but just 
most frequently  false – fits in. North (1995/1990/, p. 23) defines ideology as “subjective 
perceptions (models, theories) all people posses to explain the world around them”. Ideology 
shortens the involved trajectories of understanding just as institutions reduce the need for 
information while simplifying the task of decision-making and contributing to coordination of 
decisions of uncounted number of autonomous agents. The two are necessarily interrelated: 
by simplifying the cognitive operations, ideologies and stereotypes reduce the need for 
information and facilitate the formation of rules, whereas institutions, by directing the actions 
of the individuals and organizations undoubtedly affect the cognitive agenda and to some 
extent steer the process of acquiring the new knowledge. 
Thus, societies evolve, among other, spontaneous rules which take the form of 
informal customary norms and, on the other hand, develop ideologies and stereotypes of 
thought which simplify, distort and in a way coordinate the thought processes. An intriguing 
question for further research is whether such coordination, based on insufficiently accurate or even false perceptions of world and erroneous models of reality, can bring positive economic 
(and/or other) effects. The pressing need to coordinate somehow the decisions is the objective 
force leading to the formation of rules and the emergence of institutions, while the need to 
decide rather quickly, certainly before all potentially relevant features of the given situation 
are fully – whatever the word might mean – understood, leads to stereotypes and ideologies. 
Both processes may be driven by factors other than institutionalized sanctions: the failure to 
conform will result in decisions being out of the line with the generally adopted pattern of 
decision-making and a sure loss comes as a consequence. Conformity in thinking and acting 
seems to be directed and forced upon the agents by a set of what might be qualified as 
positive incentives: if you want to achieve the desired  results, better go along with others. 
Customary norms are embedded into the culture of a society and largely overlap with 
it. After designating culture as the bedrock of informal rules/constrains, North (1995/1990/, p. 
37) defines it as heritage containing socially transmitted information. He then further reverts 
to a definition from the literature according to which culture is conceived as the 
intergenerational transmission, through teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values and 
other determinants of individual and social behavior. A much more detailed, more 
comprehensive and more refined definition of culture is given in Haitani (1986, p. 27): it 
represents the sum total of learned behavior that is inherited by communicative interaction 
and shared by the members of a society. As such it comprehends values, behavioral norms 
(permeated evidently by ethical precepts), beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, arts, myths, customs, 
rituals and technological knowledge. Culture helps enormously in a world of uncertainty and 
cognitive hazards. The reasonably realistic assessment of our conceptualization of the world 
can only be obtained if one takes into account the costs and vagaries of struggling with 
information. The world we live in is fundamentally  different from the idealized world in 
which information is either assumed away or taken for granted.  
Culture defined as a motley heap of conspicuously variegated unwritten laws, usages, 
customs and informal normative rules brings in the elements of behavior which under no 
circumstances could fit the conventional maximizing models. North (1995/1990/, pp. 20-1) 
has cited a number of authors who explicitly bring in the altruism as pervasive behavioral 
assumption. A strange kind of identification problem arises here. Altruism or its semblance 
can fit quite well the strategy of maximizing the purely financial results and other narrow 
economic effects. The reputation of trustworthy behavior attracts the customers, brings new 
business and contributes to earning money. Being honest is under reasonably stable and 
ordered conditions an important part of the avenue leading to large wealth. The merchants 
who dominated the Serbian XIXth century cities were widely acclaimed for their honesty, but 
that was part of the manner of doing good and successful business. Is the altruistic behavior 
an alternative to pursuing the lucrative goals, an irreconcilable contradiction to it, or just a 
subtle means in the hands of the actors oriented towards maximizing the financial gains? How 
does one distinguish the commercially driven and financially inspired motivation from the 
Kantian allegiance to the abstract good as such? Be it as it may, the purely maximizing 
models can’t account for all facets of behavior and it is again the institutions and culture as 
their bedrock that one has to turn to. A much broader analytical framework is called for to 
explain the behavioral patterns of business units, not to speak of other types of organizations. 
  2.7 A More Detailed Description of Culture 
Being such a heterogeneous collection of widely differing elements such as customs 
and unwritten rules of behavior and ultimately representing the source and basis of all written, 
formalized laws, culture deserves a somewhat more detailed description. Such a description is 
admirably provided in the cited book of Haitani (1986, pp. 27-31). To bring some sort of 
structure into this to a degree entropic area, Haitani breaks it down into four classes of 
elements: values, believes, attitudes and ideologies. One is really tempted to add to this one more element, namely the positive knowledge. Such an enlargement of the definition of 
culture seems desirable especially in view of the fact that Haitani (p.27) in his explicit 
enumeration of the components of culture gives technologies as a part of it. A value is defined 
as any desirable end or means. In its abstract form, i.e., taken as a standard of desirability, it is 
taken to guide human action. Wealth, power, freedom, justice, equality, truth, life and honesty 
could be adduced as obvious examples of values. Values naturally divide into end values, 
including those which are attributes of things that are desirable in themselves as well as those 
which are referred to as deontological values, and instrumental values which are in the service 
of achieving the ultimate, the end values. The values in the first set are called goals, whereas 
those in the second set are called means. The division between the goals and the means is not 
unequivocal. Some means are so highly elevated that they are treated and called the goals, 
whereas some goals are instrumental to achieving the higher order goals and should, strictly 
speaking, be qualified as means. If and when shared by a number of persons, the values 
become group values, and if shared by practically all members of a society, they become the 
social values. Group values fall into a natural hierarchy ranging along a continuum and 
starting from those shared by the largest number of the members of society down to strictly 
individual values. It is a philosophical question whether the values shared by the largest 
number are the most important or supreme as opposed to some alternative criteria of ranking. 
A separate category of  dominant values is singled out in this context as the set of v alues 
which are “shared by the majority of people with a high degree of intensity over a 
considerable length of time” (p. 28). The dominant values of a nation constitute what is 
occasionally called the national character. 
The second class of objects within the broad realm of culture are beliefs. A belief is 
equivalent to the individual perception or the subjective model of the world, as defined by 
North (1995/1990/, pp. 17-8) and Pejovich (1995, pp. 29, 35, 54). A belief may or may not 
pass the test of critical scrutiny; conditionally speaking, it can be true or false. Values and 
beliefs interact in that the beliefs are affected by values (one who values equality highly may 
be tempted to believe that any degree of inequality of income and wealth in the long run leads 
to blatant inefficiencies and to the ruin of the national economy) and values are affected by 
the beliefs (one who believes that the free trade enhances the welfare of the humankind is 
likely to place it high in the hierarchy of values. Values and beliefs thus appear to be closely 
intertwined into large not-easy-to-distinguish complexes in which the direction of causal ties 
is hard to decipher. 
The third element of the ensemble of culture is the collection of attitudes. The word is 
taken to mean a  predisposition of mind to respond, approvingly or disapprovingly, to 
surrounding phenomena – objects, situations, changes or intellectual positions. Nationalism, 
xenophobia, inclination to an eager acceptance of novelties and tolerance are examples of 
attitudes. Haitani perceptively observes (p. 29) that an attitude is a broader concept than an 
opinion, which is a concrete way of reacting on a specific issue or phenomenon, and that it is 
at the same time a more narrow concept than value which represents a general stance whose 
ambit transcends specific phenomena or situations. The kind and substance of predispositions 
hang on the underlying values and beliefs: if someone’s attitude toward the Montenegrins is 
inimical, that may be the result of his putting the value of loyalty very high in the relevant 
hierarchy and of his belief that the Montenegrins, particularly after their endeavor to separate 
themselves out of Yugoslavia, are not terribly loyal. 
As for ideologies, the word has a wide spectrum of meanings, starting with a concrete 
program for political action up to something largely synonymous with value orientation. 
Roaming over such a wide spectrum, Haitani (p. 29) fixes himself to the definition of 
ideology as “ a value orientation that advocates or legitimizes a relationship of political 
power and/or economic interests between social groups”. The contemporary mainstream ideology seems to consist of individualism, pluralism, democracy, competition and free 
enterprise. The common thread binding all these value components is that society should not 
interfere with the life of the individual and should not obtrude his free choice in politics, 
business and other areas of life. Out of fashion is the opposite ideology that the working class 
as a group should expropriate the other, antagonistic group, the capitalist class in order to free 
itself from exploitation and to achieve its collective emancipation. The purpose of ideologies 
is to promote, rationalize  and legitimize political and/or economic relations between and 
among social groups. As Marx repeatedly emphasized, the ideologies serve, among other, to 
persuade those outside a given group to accept the legitimacy of a given set of social relations 
and thus indirectly but effectively serve as levers of power and political rule. It turns out that 
an ideology is loosely bound, open-ended set values, beliefs and attitudes endowed with 
certain advocative quality. If deprived of that quality, an ideology ceases to be ideology and 
lapses into a passive value system. O ne could hypothesize that the Southeasteuropean 
societies have for centuries had non-ideologized value systems whose latent political potential 
became activated only in the XIXth century when politically dormant value systems turned 
into ideologies and soon thereafter into massive popular movements. 
More often than not, ideologies appear as lacking logical consistency and intellectual 
coherence. Their cognitive content, as a rule, leaves much to be desired. The postulates 
embodied into an ideology reflect distorted perceptions of reality and embody what a group of 
people believe or want others to believe. “Often it is the emotive content of the ideology that 
works as a glue to hold together its illogical, irrational and deceptive elements” (Haitani 1986, 
p. 30). Yet, it is not possible to say that any society could go about without ideology. Most, if 
not all, social actions contain an element of choice. The concrete type of action cannot be 
determined by the scientific reasoning alone nor simply logically derived from a certain 
collection of facts of life. Being simultaneously a lot of other things, ideologies also appear to 
be some sort of a summary or a surrogate of the peoples individual and collective tastes and 
needs. Just as the optimum of the consumer cannot be located without taking into account his 
preference scheme, the pattern of social decision-making and acting in general cannot be 
determined without ideologies expressing in the last analysis what societies really want. 
          * 
Institutions have thus turned much more numerous, versatile and ramified than one 
would expect at the first glance. The rules in which they are embodied and through which 
they are articulated are extremely variegated. Three sets of such rules, representing clearly 
distinguishable but not strictly disjunct sets, have been identified. These are (1) laws and other 
statutes classifiable in a considerable number of categories, (2) ethical norms possessing an 
unusual quality of self-implementation and self-supervision, and (3) a truly manifold and 
diversified set of customary rules which came into being in the course of centuries and proved 
their pragmatic value through an agelong practice. The major trait along which these rules can 
be distinguished is the manner of their enforcement. The legal norms are enforced by the 
coercive power and actions of the government, the only organization with the legal monopoly 
on the use of violence. Ethical norms are enforced partly by the internal mechanisms of 
conscience and moral urge to opt for good and act in accordance with the categorical 
imperative. Customary rules are largely self-enforced and followed on the account of the fact 
that it simply pays everyone concerned to act in accordance with them; acting in line with 
customary norms appears  in a vast number of situations to be the only way to coordinate 
one’s own decisions with those of the others, which is, on the other hand, the precondition for 
such decisions to bring the desired, objectively achievable effects. If I want to sell a pair of 
oxen, I’d better take them to the village fair on one of the days the fairs are taking place; 
otherwise there will be a small likelihood of completing successfully the transaction. While the principal mechanisms of enforcement are generally specific to each of the 
three described classes of norms and rules, they are by no means exclusively tied to “their” 
appropriate classes. Thus, obeying the laws carries with it an unequivocal moral connotation 
and the custom of following the legal norms contributes to coordination and brings obvious 
practical, including financial, benefits. Neglecting ethical norms brings not only remorse but 
not infrequently separating out of the relevant social groups and even ostracism; the acts of 
violence and physical sanctions are not excluded either. And customary norms are evidently 
laden with ethical content and, again, are here and there enforced through the acts of 
collective violence. Customary norms are not that far removed from the laws, the best 
evidence of which is the fact that customs are recognized as one of the most important sources 
of law (Lukic 1988, pp. 249-51). 
The three-legged classification of the rules constituting institutions goes a long way in 
helping to understand the vagaries and serious difficulties of institutional change. The reforms 
and all other forms of social engineering are only capable of acting on one set of rules 
belonging to a much broader set of institutions. Namely, it is only the legal rules that can be 
acted upon. But they are just a small part of the sum total of rules that regulate the functioning 
of any society. The metaphor of the iceberg has already been used and should be invoked 
again to underline the fact that legal rules are just a tiny fraction of all the rules prevailing in a 
society. Changing just legal rules cannot obviously be an effective way of affecting the 
institutional overhaul of a society. As other rules continue to operate in a more or less 
unchanged form  – or, if they are changed, the change proceeds as a result of completely 
different set of mechanisms and follows different operational principles – the resulting effect 
cannot, as a general principle, be particularly impressive. For having a real turnaround in the 
way in which a society functions the transformation of a much larger set of rules would be 
necessary. However, organized ways of changing ethical and customary rules do not exist. 
The only known recent attempt to change the ethical basis of a society was the well known 
Cultural Revolution of Mao Tse-tung, but it turned out to be a spectacular failure. Hence there 
follows a simple and evident conclusion: the limits of reforms and social engineering are a 
fact of life, institutional reforms cannot be pursued at will, there are serious constraints to be 
taken into account. Moreover, in designing the institutional change the existing ethical base 
and customary infrastructure of the society has to be counted with. Otherwise grave 
inconsistencies between the legal norms and the rules belonging to the other two sets will 
arise and the end result is likely to prove a disappointing failure. 
    
  9. Southeastern Europe: The Case of Historical Lock-in of Institutional Development 
The preceding eight sections, which turned much more extensive and wordy than 
anticipated, are meant to provide a general methodological platform, a set of analytical tools 
and a broad backdrop against which more specific traits of economic and social development 
of Southeastern Europe will be considered. Little was said that could be considered as a 
concrete analysis of Southeasteuropean economic and institutional realities even though the 
part of analysis dealing with the possibilities of institutional and civilizational stagnation, as 
well as the part considering the hazards of perverted social developments had a more than 
accidental bearing on the complex, untoward and occasionally calamitous history of 
Southeastern Europe. The sequel of this text is intended to be much more specific. Its purpose 
is to identify the institutional constraints on the Southeasteuropean development drawing on 
the repertoire of concepts and the methodological toolkit developed in the previous sections. 
    3. Institutional Backdrop of the Southeasteuropean Development: A Case of 
        Historical Lock-in 
As was indicated in the introduction to the first part of this study, its purpose was to 
provide a general framework and an analytical toolkit by means of which broad social determinants of development could be analyzed and, as it were, to introduce the language in 
which the versatile development phenomena could be dealt with. This second part is intended 
to be noticeably more specific. It is meant to be as closely tied to the Southeasteuropean 
realities as possible and to contribute to an understanding of the development obstacles in this 
part of the continent in a more concrete way. The focus is, of course, on those determinants of 
economic and social development which can be illuminated through the conceptual tools and 
analytical procedures of the institutional analysis. The implication of the approach taken in 
the study as a whole is that it is the institutional sphere that contains the most powerful factors 
of the overall development. It is thus hoped that the most exciting elements of the 
development story will be told b y concentrating on the structure and evolution of the 
underlying institutional order. So far little has been said that could be considered as a concrete 
analysis of Southeasteuropean economic and institutional realities. The abstract character of 
the analysis presented so far is readily discernible even though the part of analysis dealing 
with the possibilities of institutional and civilizational stagnation, as well as the part 
considering the hazards of perverted social developments, had a more than accidental bearing 
on the complex, untoward and occasionally calamitous history of Southeastern Europe.  
       3.1 Initial State as a Determinant of the Options for the Future Development 
The first thing to note is that the initial states of any collection of observed societies 
unavoidably vary in a wide spectrum and along a large number of dimensions. That is true not 
only for, how ever chosen, present, but also for any moment of historical time. Careful 
analysis could demonstrate that a large part of developments observed in the past could to a 
significant extent be explained by the tenets of the relevant initial positions from which the 
societies had to make their hazardous ventures into development of their economies and the 
associated modernization of their institutional scaffoldings. It would, of course, be a fatalistic 
fallacy to assert that future developments are uniquely determined by the initial positions. 
There is always scope for choice and the calamitous interplay of the unforeseeable 
contingencies. Initial state is, first of all, a repository of the constraints on the paths of future 
development: the choice is generally nonremovable, but at any time it can only be done within 
certain, in this case dynamically framed constraints. In addition to being a repository of 
constraints on the trajectories of future movements, initial states are the stockrooms of 
historical individual and collective memories. This societal remembrance affects greatly 
whatever choices are being made within given constraints. The influence goes both through 
the system of preferences, including collective predilections and ideologies, and the available 
knowledge which generally proves to be the ultimate constraint on human action.  
Much of what constrains the present activities and future changes is closely associated 
with history which in the case of Southeastern Europe evidently plays a much bigger role than 
elsewhere in Europe, at least with respect to developmental constraints and the civilizational 
lock-ins which are such a conspicuous part of Southeasteuropean realities. History matters (1) 
as a determinant of the present state, (2) as a storage of collective memories, and (3) as a way 
of getting to where the systems are now – to the extent that this way determines the manner of 
muddling through in the future. The ways and manners likely to come forward in the future 
are certainly not independent of the ways having taken place in the past. This appears to be 
true even if the learning effects and the influence of the inherited knowledge are abstracted 
from.  
A major determining characteristic of the Southeasteuropean history is its remarkable 
discontinuity. The lands in this area have spent some five centuries under the Turkish yoke. 
Two features of this alien rule seem to be significant. Firstly, most of the time spent under the 
Turks was in the declining stage of the Turkish empire, i. e. in the phase in which the empire 
had anachronic and development stifling institutions. Secondly, the centuries spent under the 
Ottoman empire were crucially important from the point of view of the secular development in the rest of the continent: those were either the centuries of unprecedented modernization of 
the Western Europe or the centuries of sustained preparation for it. The Proustian loss of time 
is bad in itself, but having lost those particular centuries appears to have disastrous 
consequences in the light of the global development experience. Those were the years lost not 
just for the acquisition of real resources and accumulation of capital, but also, and more 
importantly, for the accumulation of knowledge. Dynamic implications of falling behind in 
the acquisition of knowledge has dynamic implications which probably span centuries and 
produce a civilizational lag which may take centuries to compensate or might even turn not to 
be compensable at all. The differences in the development levels, formed in the course of the 
last couple of hundreds of years, exhibit a marked persistency and, while convergence 
tendencies and change of rank in the of the development levels do occur within the set of 
advanced countries and regions, there is a steady deepening of the gaps in per capita incomes 
and other magnitudes between the developed world as a whole and the more or less compactly 
cast underdeveloped world (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, pp. 414-24, 455-61). 
Another characteristic of societies long ruled by an alien power – and in this part of 
Europe that happened to be the same Asiatic empire – is a relatively weak ethical structure 
within the framework of the global society. To begin with, being enslaved could not be seen 
as an environment particularly conducive to the strengthening of morals. It is only natural to 
see a considerable broadening of means that can be “legitimately” used against those who 
oppress you on the ethnic and the religious basis. The Serbian folk poems are full of praise for 
the haiduks who plundered and killed the travelers and merchants, provided only they did it, 
among others, to the ruling Turks (cf. the famous poem  Vujadin, t he Old Man). The 
supremacy of Turks over the Christians was such that any Turk could have dropped into any 
Christian house and stay as long as he wanted, helping himself with food, drinks and the 
female members of the family (Dzadzic 1987, pp. 124-55). Dzadzic (p. 124) points out that 
the number or written testimonies of various forms of violence, particularly those touching the 
dignity of  the people, is remarkably rare. He hypothesizes that this might be due to a peculiar 
form of self-censorship, demonstrating how painful these memories are and how gigantic an 
effort had been made to suppress them somehow. Dzadzic then nevertheless goes on citing a 
large number of historically recorded instances of gross violence committed by the ruling 
Turks against the Christian Serbs, including in particular the cases of drastic dishonoring. In 
such a situation the establishment of morals must have been discouraged on at least two 
accounts. Firstly, moral sentiment, to use A. Smith’s and Lukic’s (1982, p. 113) term, is very 
likely to weaken or even to be entirely discarded in face of such brutal moral disgrace; a man 
with badly hurt dignity is unlikely to develop a keen sense of moral duty. Secondly, The 
feeling of anger and revenge will probably inspire the use of means which largely transcend 
the realm of what is usually considered as morally permissible. 
The next important feature of social life likely and bound to be distorted is the stance 
toward the law. The effective laws had, of course, been those introduced and upheld by the 
alien oppressive, exploiting and disgracing power. Breaking such laws must have become and 
remained a matter of patriotic obligation and peculiar moral duty. Obeying the laws, in turn, 
must have been perceived as a matter of collaboration with the oppressor and acquiescence to 
what clearly appears to be an attack on your wealth, life and honor. The tradition of disrespect 
for law and direct opposing to it seems to be an unavoidable product of such a broad social 
situation, of such a, to use the Malraux’s syntagm, condition humaine. Such developments in 
the sphere of social psychology have, again, long run implications. Once the denigrating 
stance toward the law is adopted, there is no guarantee that it will not shade into the new age, 
the one following the national liberation and the establishment of the independent and in 
many respects modernized state. The legacy of the inimical perception and reception of the 
law is a long run liability weighing heavily upon the prospects of proper modernization of the society and, by implication, on the institutional preconditions for successful economic 
development. An additional difficulty is the heritage of a motley mixture of various legal 
systems, moral codes and customary arrangements. While there might a ppear certain 
processes of cross-fertilization and synergic interaction, it is not too hazardous to conclude 
that the effects of inconsistency of these versatile components will prevail and that their 
mismatch almost inevitably leads to chaotic and destructive tendencies bearing unfavorably 
on the coherence of societal arrangements and the prospects for stable and sustained progress. 
One may make a further step in the elaboration of the relevant detail: not only are there likely 
to appear inconsistencies within the sets of legal, moral and customary rules as defined in the 
preceding sections and summarized at the end of section 2.7, but one should expect the 
inconsistencies between those sets: moral rules would quite likely find themselves at odds 
with legal arrangements and both could with some likelihood find themselves in opposition 
with customary schemes. The conflict between legal arrangements, on the one, and the sets of 
moral norms and customary rules, on the other hand, is much more likely than the conflict 
between the moral dicta and customary regulations. This fact sets severe limits on all types of 
social engineering in the form of legal reforms. If the newly enacted legal documents don’t 
have their support in the informal norms and behavioral standards, the likelihood of the new 
legal acts letting roots in the social fabric is very low indeed (Pejovich 1999).  
  3.2 The Significance of the Paths Having Led to the Initial States 
It is easy to recognize the importance of any initial state in which a society finds itself 
in a given moment of historical time. That remains true despite the fact that not all dimensions 
of the initial state and not all ways in which they interact with the current development 
processes may be clearly seen. However, it is not just the initial states that matter, but equally 
important appears to be also the way and the path along which the system reached a given 
position. Two systems with equal initial positions but different ways of arriving at them will 
generally have different development potential, different prospects and opportunities for 
future evolution. Thus, history matters. To recapitulate and reemphasize the points made in 
the previous section, it matters (1) in the obvious way of being the self-asserting determinant 
of the given initial state, (2) as a repository of information, knowledge and experience 
generated by the path of the past development, and (3) as the resultant of the ways of getting 
to where the system found itself and of the means used to implement the past transitions. The 
means and ways used and learned in the past are likely to be used in the future and to 
determine to an extent the developments to be followed in the coming years. 
The first and perhaps the most important characteristic of the past development, seen 
as a determinant of future events, is the variability of the path, in particular the degree to 
which it is strewn with severe and destructive shocks and filled with the complex and 
unpredictable twists and turns. One could talk about the sum total of changes that have 
burdened a given history, especially of the amount of adverse changes representing a part of 
collective culture and historical heritage. The lack of stability of the past development and of 
the smoothness and continuity of the c orresponding dynamic trajectories appears to be a 
particularly heavy handicap regarding the quality of the inherited institutional setup and also 
with respect to future institutional development. The adjustability of institutions and 
flexibility of the entire social order depend in an essential way on the collective memories and 
the past experiences in organizing various parts of the society to overcome the existential 
threats and challenges. To bring forth the crucial aspect of the impact of instability on the 
performance related qualities of institutions, if changes are frequent, abrupt and too much out 
of line with past experiences, the periods of adjustments are short and the spells spent on 
learning about the new circumstances and inventing the ways of confronting them are too 
limited to give any collectivity a serious chance to shape a proper arrangement duly tuned to 
the new situation. If, because of sudden and generally unpredictable changes, the intervals in the course of which the new institutions are to coordinate the decisions of the collective actors 
are too short, then clearly highly effective institutions cannot be expected.  
Out of the reasons accounting for such a fact worth mentioning are two. Firstly, in an 
overly short time it is simply impossible to design the high performance institutions because 
such institutions take time not only to be built and enacted or socially accepted, but also to be 
prepared by preceding observation, reflection, experimentation and gradual adjustment to the 
newly emerged realities. By far more importantly, to the extent that institutions are not a 
matter of conscious design but a product of slow and very gradual adjustment to the survival 
needs of a community and a matter of very broad and long lasting experience, the sheer time 
emerges as the basic precondition of the formation of institutions, particularly those which 
themselves successfully pass the test of time and performance (Schoenfelder 2001, p. 6). As 
for the consciously engineered institutions, one could  talk even of some sort of a lag 
preceding all above enumerated operations, starting with observation and ending with 
activation of the new arrangements. Namely, to make it purposeful at all to undertake all these 
activities, the concerned actors will have to convince themselves that the newly arisen change 
will last: it certainly doesn’t make sense to adjust to changes which are ephemeral and which 
will soon be replaced by other constellations. Secondly, all these activities imply costs and 
their undertaking has to pass some sort of, perhaps implicit but nevertheless necessary, cost-
benefit analysis. Cost depends on the magnitude and the type of adjustment; the benefits 
depend upon a host of determining factors, but among the most important of them is certainly 
the length of time during which the benefits are expected to be reaped. If changes are 
frequent, large and unpredictable, the periods over which the benefits would be forthcoming 
are too short and hardly any compensating factors can reverse the unfavorable result of the 
conceptualized cost-benefit calculation. The conclusion is thus clear: the frequent and big 
changes make it both unworthwhile and impossible to affect the appropriate institutional 
adjustments to such changes; the volatile historical situation makes it practically impossible to 
arrive at and maintain the high quality institutions. 
The above reasoning has an easily identifiable implication. In order to be able even to 
entertain a hope of having well designed and effectively performing institutions, one has to 
have a fairly stable, even development, without too many and too powerful shocks, a 
development with relatively smooth and – at least and in a way – piecewise continuous 
trajectory. This requirement should, of course, be read as a metaphor rather than a 
mathematical statement. The smoothness of the trajectory is clearly not a sufficient but just a 
necessary condition for arriving at the efficient – whatever the term might mean – institutions. 
One thus arrives at an important conclusion  having an unmistakable bearing on the entire 
region of Southeastern Europe. Due to its turbulent past and volatile history, Southeastern 
Europe had little or no chance to create high quality institutions, no matter what criteria of 
evaluation are. The necessary condition for such a state of affairs – reasonably long spells of 
relatively peaceful and stable development – was lacking. The state of affairs was quite to the 
contrary. The sufficient condition for not having high quality institutions has more or less 
permanently been a feature of the social situation in this part of Europe. Southeasteuropean 
history contains the principal answers to the key question of institutional deficiency and 
civilizational lag of the region. History did not give the region the chance to develop the set of 
modern, performance oriented institutions and thus to align itself with the historically more 
fortunate West. This simplified statement will probably have to undergo a number of 
qualifications, one of the most important being the feedback influence of institutions on the 
development itself. Yet, there is reason to expect that the basic message will survive because 
there is abundant historical evidence that the past shocks and historical traumas have by and 
large been externally generated and that they, not impacts of institutional feedback, dominated 
in the interplay of the grandiose secular forces within the large scheme of history. Another way of expressing and substantiating the basic idea of the lack of, 
conditionally speaking, historical continuity and stability as a source and cause of institutional 
drawbacks in Southeastern Europe is to observe that, in the atmosphere of general volatility, 
very few repeated interactions took place. Such interactions are few in number because the 
exogenous changes and external shocks bring new situations and with them new types of 
interactions. Whatever class of interactions is looked at, the interactions cannot be numerous 
in a spasmodic pattern of historical changes which implies very short homogenous periods 
between successive exogenous shocks. Moreover, even if some type of interactions survived a 
shock or more of them, that would be equivalent to changing the type of interactions: the 
same interactions under significantly changed circumstances cease to be the same. Frequent 
attacks of the incomparably more powerful external forces and long periods of enslavement 
have produced long periods of exogenously imposed primitive organization of economic life. 
The basic feature of such organization was an extremely low volume of exchange, with large 
segments of economic life without any exchange at all. It is evident that in such environments 
contracting practices had very little chance to develop and the paucity of contracts led in turn 
to slow or entirely missing development of institutional framework facilitating and regulating 
exchange. This would be the way in which history had a direct bearing on growth and 
ramification of economic institutions. 
The described pattern of historical evolution, accounting for slow or altogether 
missing emergence of rules and institutions, could also be relied on to explain the long 
tradition of authoritarian rule, tyrannical government and personalized regimes in 
Southeasteuropean lands. If the rules are defective, grossly incomplete or entirely absent, the 
governance vacua are automatically and inevitably filled with the personalized power 
relationships and the rule of man substitutes for the rule of law. The famous Ciceronian 
dictum Non sub hominem sed sub legem is exactly reversed. The rule of man over man has an 
obviously disastrous effect on morals. In fact, only equality before the rules can facilitate and 
favor the strengthening of the morals as the liberty under the law provides the necessary 
security to follow ethical imperatives and decline to acquiesce to unprincipled compromises. 
Since the authoritarian ruling elite has always the option of either applying the laws or not 
applying them, the very function of law becomes perverted. Rather than constraining and 
controlling the political power, law becomes one of its mightiest instruments. 
  3.3 The Implications of the Past Developments: Experiences of Serbia and Greece 
The sub hominem type of social relationships generates the evidently unavoidable 
concentration of political power which distorts the behavioral motivation in a way which is 
analogous to the monopoly in economics. The political system becomes overtly rigid and the 
ruling establishment irreplaceable. The political elite controls the populace instead of being 
controlled by it. The political rules profoundly change their nature and the way they function: 
they grow into an elaborate mechanism of controlling the people, converting them into 
compliant subjects and preserving them in the psychological frame and the behavioral pattern 
of  obedience. Whatever laws exist are selectively applied and their incompleteness and 
contradictions between and among their parts and wholes make it impossible to act in 
accordance with such laws. Everybody becomes guilty, as effectively asserted in the famous 
novel The Monk and the Death by M. Selimovic, and the guilt is not only internal and 
subjective but also objective and legally demonstrable. When everyone is guilty, everyone can 
be arbitrarily and at will punished  and hence everyone has to be obedient and can be 
effectively controlled. Again, being obedient not to the rules but to the personalized 
constellations of political and punitive power is a mechanism of killing the dignity and 
undercutting the morality in the society at large, which  in turn destroys one of the pillars of 
institutional architecture of any society.  History provides abundant evidence to corroborate this statement. The famous Serbian 
publicist, literary critic and social writer S. Markovic (1946/1872/, pp. 40, 46, 53, 71) 
enumerates many instances and manifestations of low morality: the mentality of obedience 
rules supreme (p. 53), the war plundering was a natural, widely accepted way of personal 
enrichment and of acquiring the office of a local boss (p. 63), when summoned to the court 
“…they seize the riffle and take to the woods” with ample evidence of contempt for the court 
(pp. 70-1) and, worst of all, “…the stealth, the plunder and the homicide, only if done to the 
Turk, in times of peace as well as of war, were considered as moral acts” (p. 40). 
 Southeastern Europe is an area in which, over long stretches of history, the laws have 
been not only unjust and cruel but also unobservable because of their inconsistency and 
conspicuous remoteness from the facts and the relationships of life. The disobedience with 
respect to law was practically imposed and forced upon the people. That provides an 
additional, in a way structural reason for the low standing of law and the long tradition of its 
neglecting. Where the law is being neglected as a matter of daily routine, the chances for 
institutions to take hold and to matter are slim indeed. Institutional underdevelopment 
becomes a kind of societal destiny. The absence of the rule of law and the secular 
strengthening of the personalized power has over centuries been the institutional basis of 
strong statism and widespread governmental dirigisme in all spheres of social life. Oversized 
and widely ramified government has turned into destiny of all Southeasteuropean countries. 
Many components of their history reduce to the narratives of this or that type of governmental 
interventionism.  
Svetozar Markovic has also provided a telling and impressive testimony of the causes 
and consequences of excessive and oppressive etatism in the modern Serbian history (starting 
at the beginning of the XIXth century). The important point emerging from his considerations 
is that the oppressive and authoritarian character of the Serbian national state, which 
practically gained independence by Sultan’s edict of 1830 and later, more fully and formally, 
on the Congress of Berlin 1878, was inherited from the Turkish rule. The Turkish 
governmental machinery, designed to rule over the oppressed Christian subjects, was simply 
transplanted into the new arrangement. It was tuned to regulating the relationships among 
various layers of bureaucracy and affirmed across the board the techniques of bossing the 
people rather than the citizens’ rights and the institutional guarantees of responsibility of the 
government to the electorate. Markovic (1946/1872/, p. 94) considers this a deadly blow to 
the democratic aspirations of the people. He had in mind the magnificent and unrepeatable 
which surfaced in the ill-articulated form in the glorious First Serbian Uprising back in 1804. 
Namely, the entire Turkish hierarchy of ruling over people, rather than on behalf of them as 
well as in full responsibility to them was simply transplanted into the new realities. The state 
treasury was coincidental with the sovereign’s personal purse (the sovereign was the famous 
Duke Milos, who eventually wrought out independence more by bribes and diplomatic means 
than by the armed struggle, even though the arms have eloquently spoken as well).  
Both the Duke and the members of the newly emerged governing elite thought the 
Sultan, not people, was the ultimate source of power. All of them treated people in the 
Turkish style, i.e. not as a source of sovereignty and the central element of responsibility but 
as a set of ordinary objects of ordering and governing, to be exploited and bossed around. The 
members of the elite fought against the Duke not to safeguard the citizens’ rights and 
freedoms but just to extract for themselves as much political power as possible (p. 85). In the 
reckless fights for political supremacy people were typically neglected and in turning to the 
Sultan as a source of sovereignty all kinds of immoral means and ways were used (p. 84). The 
members of the political elite, called the fighters for the constitution, were characterized by a 
barbaric mentality (Markovic 1946/1872/, p. 100) and thought that the only purpose of the 
new political arrangement was simply to replace the Turks and make sure that people are obedient and caught into a network of permanent subjugation. Conspicuously absent was the 
very idea of inalienable human rights and freedoms as well as the respect for individual 
dignity and its unrepeatable uniqueness. Serbian lands and the entire Serbian people were 
treated by the ruling elite as “a gift of the Sultan who gave them (the people – Lj.M.) as his 
property to the captains, the local lords, the councilors and rest of the gentry. The only thing 
that happened is that the Serbs came instead of the Turks to rule, and that is all there is to it – 
and people had just candidly to obey…” (Markovic 1946/1872/, p. 100). The other side of the 
coin was noticeable absence of the feeling of obligation, formalized of not, on the part of 
people toward the dignitaries of the newly created state: the years of national emancipation 
(the first decades of the XIXth century) turned out to be a period of frequent uprisings both 
against the Duke and the lower level dignitaries. These lower echelon nobles were themselves  
almost steadily fighting against him (Markovic 1946/1872/, p. 88). Summarizing, despite 
people’s ardent desire for order and justice, they were given armies of bureaucrats (p. 98), 
organized into oversized and slow grinding machinery and structured so as to facilitate the 
rule over people, with most legal arrangements framed to regulate the relations among the 
bosses rather than protecting the freedom of the citizens. 
Greek historic experience is another important piece of evidence which can profitably 
be drawn on. It vividly demonstrates that legally formalized, officially promulgated 
institutions, being just a part of a much wider regulating structure, stand little chance to 
succeed if they find themselves incompatible with the rest of the structure, particularly with a 
wide variety of customary norms and standards. The lack of success may also result from the 
absence of certain political preconditions. To the extent that the newly designed institutional 
machinery finds itself at odds with the general morphology of power structure, it may be 
rejected as a sort of alien tissue and never be able to actualize itself in the expected way. As 
elaborated to some detail in Minoglou (1995, pp. 261-3), the configuration of political and 
social power was not consistent with the set of new, democratic and modernizing, institutions 
in the sense of having a global system capable of producing the results comparable to those  
recorded in mature democracies. Property rights were rudimentary and the group of property 
holders was relatively weak, the urban dwellers and other citizens paying the above average 
taxes were scattered throughout society and poorly organized, the general level of political 
and fiscal culture was quite low and the society as a whole was remarkably weak in protecting 
itself against the growing bureaucracy and the coercive state giving their deep imprint to the 
entire nexus of social relationships. As nation building, just as in the case of Serbia, was an 
extremely costly venture, resources consumed by the state had to be substantial. 
  3.4. Further Discussion of the Greek and Serbian Experience  
The Greek problem was primarily the glaring inconsistency between the set of modern 
political institutions and the social structure, with power configuration inherited from the past. 
Two avenues to solving the problem opened themselves: high taxes and incurring foreign 
debt. Due to the vagaries of political competition, particularly to parties vying for political 
support by promising the alleviation of the tax burden and being partly true to it, the second 
alternative was heavily relied on and Greece quickly became one of the most indebted 
countries of the world. There is still a saying in Serbia: that man is as heavily indebted as 
Greece. This country appears to have been the case of a modern, democratic governance 
superstructure not having been able to produce socially and otherwise acceptable results 
because of the weak economic and social foundations on which that superstructure was 
crafted. Minoglou (1995, p. 255) reports that immediately after the declaration of 
independence (London Treaty, 1832) protecting powers arranged for a 60 million gold franc 
loan, with 60% of its nominal value being withheld to cover the initial interest and 
amortization payments. The loan, very much similar to the subsequent loans, was used to pay 
generously the oversized bureaucracy and foreign troops, as well as to finance other war-related expenses. All of these were components of the current consumption whereas prospects 
for generating sufficient export earnings to service the debt were practically nonexistent. 
Greece defaulted in 1843 and for the next 47 years was banned from the international capital 
market. Greek sovereignty was severely circumscribed, if not eliminated. Despite an interim 
attempt to raise another foreign loan, Greece was not able to approach the capital market until 
1879 when the debt settlement was finally reached and the ban on using foreign finance 
removed. But the state, much for the same reasons, continued to struggle with severe financial 
difficulties and eventually, after nine years the International Financial Commission (IFC) was 
set up and imposed upon Greece. As far as the freedom to formulate and implement 
macroeconomic policies was concerned, this was equivalent to putting Greece under the 
protectorate of this international body. The IFC continued to run the country in the important 
dimension of formulating and implementing macroeconomic policies for the next twenty 
years. Much of the statehood, painfully and with the force of arms wrought out from the 
Turks, was lost, as it were, behind the back of the nation, through financial transactions and 
diplomatic maneuvers.  
The Greek case even suggests the idea of the existence of strictly economic 
preconditions for the institutions of parliamentary democracy. The three big powers, the 
guarantors of the Greek independence, provided for a monarchy without constitutional 
limitations. However, the Greek society, spontaneously democratized through the national 
liberation struggle, dismantled the monarchical shell and, inspired by the ideas of the French 
Revolution, introduced a set of modern, parliamentary institutions. This is where the 
contradiction developed between the political superstructure and the insufficiently structured 
society, including, in particular, its poor and stunted industrial base. Minoglou speaks about 
failed parliamentarism (1995, p. 261) on account of inconsistency of the rapidly modernized 
political architecture with the broader, largely traditional social base. The interplay of the 
suddenly liberated democratic forces was too demanding and actually unsustainable by the 
weak economic substratum. The prevalence of politics over economy produced a peculiar 
mechanism, akin to that described by De Jasay (1985, p. 259), through which the parties 
compete by offering publicly owned resources to raise the living standard of the populace and 
thus to enlist the sought political support. Increasing public debt is actually equivalent to 
consuming the commonly owned resources because it is the collectivity of the future tax 
payers that are to bear the burden of servicing.  
Predictably created and immediately observable was the corresponding economic 
outcome: a poor and undeveloped institutional framework produced quite an inefficient 
allocation and utilization of resources. Unequivocal indications can be found that the poor 
performance of the institutional machinery was largely due to the mismatch between the 
newly implanted Western contrivances and the distinctly traditional surrounding devices, 
including the endemic culture reflecting domestic idiosyncrasies. Many forms of organizing 
activities and many types of contracts cannot fully assert and affirm themselves in the 
environment of structurally different, mostly traditional regulatory rules. Schoenfelder (1999, 
p. 2) points to a more than indicative fact that a number of Balkan countries (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Serbia) adopted legal systems of Westeuropean descent around 1850 but “never 
really managed to put these systems to life”. The combination of a widely ramified network of 
contracts and a weak machinery of their enforcement led to all kinds of opportunistic behavior 
generated by the systemic failure. It further led to a deplorable waste of resources as well as  
to all-pervading failure to use investment and other opportunities. This institutional weakness 
is analogous to the above described political weakness consisting of a combination of 
overdosed working democracy and the resulting weak democratic state.  
History provides plentiful evidence of the  importance of institutional causes in 
accounting for the economic underperformance of Southeasteuropean countries. Minoglou (1995, p. 254) enumerates four factors constraining the inflow of foreign direct investment, 
which might be seen as a proxy for general readiness to spur development and to modernize: 
scanty and backward property rights in agriculture, the thinness of the rural labor market, the 
legal framework for foreign investment and the refusal of the state to grant attractive public 
work concessions to potential investors. It is characteristic that out of four adduced factors 
only one appears to be of a structural variety; the remaining three are either institution-bound 
or policy-related.  
The other and perhaps much more important lesson to be drawn from the experience 
of all Southeasteuropean lands, as exemplified by Serbia and Greece, is that economic 
development and industrialization are not the only goals that have been pursued nor the only 
societal needs to which institutions are to be attuned. One of the big alternatives is the nation 
building which could be taken as a proxy for something incomparably more important, 
namely the national security. The latter is a fundamental need arising at practically all levels 
of social organization and is closely tied to the idea of national liberation and national dignity. 
It should be apparent that security and economic growth are not perfectly aligned, that 
conflicts in pursuing the two are bound to arise and that one should expect clear and 
irremovable trade-offs between the two strategic social needs. While giving modest results in 
economic growth and modernization, the relevant institutional framework might have been 
excellent from the point of view of security and, moreover, might generally have been perfect 
from the point of view of both criteria, provided the proper weights are attached to them in a 
synthetic objective function. The experience of Greece is illuminating in that respect. 
Throughout the first part of the XIXth century, and to a considerable extent during the second 
part, the property relations were not developed with a view to strengthening the institutional 
base of a modern market economy, particularly its motivation structure, but with the strategic 
objective of creating a unified marked as a foundation of national unity and monolithic 
statehood; potential economic effects were lost to the higher political aims of forging a lasting 
and powerful polity (Minoglou 1995, p. 263). 
Weak societies – those with poorly institutionalized property rights, with weak and 
ineffective owners, with powerless political organizations, feeble nongovernmental 
associations and understrength civil society – are, as a rule, characterized by relatively strong 
governments and tough, vigorous bureaucracies. This  fundamental feature of the newly 
emerging Southeasteuropean societies was the true intellectual obsession and a major source 
of inspiration of the greatest Serbian XIXth century social thinker S. Markovic. Most of his 
work, and particularly his seminal book on the development of the Serbian society 
(1946/1872/), is devoted to demonstrating the proposition that bureaucracy represents the 
dominant social force and that the entire social structure could be seen along the contradictory 
and antagonistic grand relation between the bureaucracy and the rest of society.  Etatism 
becomes the prevailing configuration of social interdependencies and stamps its lasting 
imprints on all important segments of social life. The dominance of the state and the 
bureaucracy not only prevents the liberation of the society, exemplified, among other, by the 
market economy and the pluralistic polity, but also leaves a lasting heritage preventing the 
democratic emancipation of the society for a long future time to come.  
The development of capitalist institutions is prevented by the long shadows of the past 
– by the tradition of the governmental coercion and bureaucratic rule which produced the 
patterns of organization, behavior and thought difficult to counter even in the contemporary 
venture of transition to a modern, open society. Etatist structures occasionally come about as 
a result of curious historical accidents. One such is persuasively described by S. Markovic 
(1946/1872/, pp. 49, 62-3, 65). The Serbian society was subject to the Turkish rule and was a 
set of collectivities of equals with traditional and highly developed local autonomy. Had the 
Turkish rule been abolished in one or two years, as it seemed at the beginning of the liberation struggle, such an even social structure would have been an ideal social basis for institutions of 
the democratic rule in the ambit of the entire society. That, however, didn’t happen. The 
struggle dragged on for some fifteen years, enough for a ruling military elite to spring up. 
That elite was the beginning of an undesirable stratification of society, for differentiation and 
lasting forms of inequality among its members and for relations of dominance and oppression 
to be implanted as permanent features of social organization. Irretrievably lost w as the 
magnificent initial opportunity for a democratic system to grow on the traditional foundations 
of deeply rooted equality. 
The inherited situations following the initial attempts to modernization, undertaken in 
Southeastern Europe in the course of the XIXth century, halted development. The states 
arrived at are – both at structural and institutional plane  – such that just removing the 
impediments is not enough. Distortions of prices and markets generate distortions in the 
institutional sphere, which then carry over into the political relationships and the balance of 
social forces. Such configurations then become powerful obstacles to the long awaited 
institutional reforms; the deadly feedback is unmistakably at work. History matters – and, 
indeed, in the most disagreeable way. 
  3.5 Cognitive Limitations on Southeasteuropean Development 
Human action is not the only but certainly is, and has always been, one of the most 
important determinants of development. Hopefully this statement preserves some relevance 
despite the fact that one might be tempted to ask questions about the determinants of the 
human action itself. Some relevance is hopefully preserved even though the term  action 
cannot for this context be quite satisfactorily defined. It is a matter of everyday experience 
that one set of actions conditions another set and/or defines the constraints for a third set of 
actions. It is not easy to be precise in defining the effects of any (set of) action(s), no matter 
how it is defined and it is even more difficult to delineate with any degree of reliability the 
wide ramifications of given actions. Leaving aside such conceptual refinements, it will be 
accepted as a fairly certain proposition that human action affects development(s) at all levels 
of social organization and that the action itself may and will depend on a number of factors 
which have clear relevance for the speed and directions of evolution of variously defined 
segments of the society and of the society as a whole. Action is important as an autonomous 
driving force and as a medium through which other relevant factors assert themselves.  
The basic insight on which one can build many analyses of economic and social 
change is that people and their groups act not on the true facts – whatever the meaning of the 
two words – of reality but on their perception (or reception) of it. The bewildering complexity 
of the world around us, the modest capacity to comprehend it and to see through the 
regularities of its functioning, the highly circumscribed ability  to collect and process 
information, the algorithmic limitations and the computational constraints – all of these plot to 
make it impossible to weld a coherent and reliable picture of the world. North (1995/1990/, p. 
8) speaks of the mental constructs, imperfect subjective models and even incorrect models. 
Pejovich (1995, p. 29) points to an amazing variety of observed behaviors and speaks of them 
as “…evidence of the individual’s subjective perceptions of reality”. Actions that have been 
taking place in the long series of past periods have relied not on the above indicated true facts, 
but on the delusions and fallacies, on the seductive shadows of these facts. There is a big and 
occasionally dangerous distance between the – how ever defined – true picture of reality and 
the models of the reality formed by our feeble and stunted cognitive and information 
processing capacities. 
 While being unavoidable and universal, the distance between the “truth” and the 
reality, it, however, is far from being the same in all environments and all cultures. It is 
accepted as a sort of axiomatic truth that the larger this distance, the less efficient will be, 
ceteris paribus, the economic and social processes under review and the slower and less beneficial will be the overall social evolution. In particular, with a large distance between the 
objects and processes, as parts of reality, and their subjective, mental and cognitive, 
projections, as the intellectual reflections of the world, one should expect a low secular rate of 
growth and a considerable lag in the level of how ever defined development. If there is at all a 
single comprehensive factor which could account for a huge lag of the southeastern part of the 
Continent with respect to the advanced societies, the first candidate would have to be a small 
quantity of knowledge and low level of capacity to expand it. Southeastern Europe has an 
extremely unfavorable geographic location, the one which boils down to a real handicap 
exactly regarding the availability of knowledge, the prospects of expanding it through 
absorption from the surrounding regions and the capacity to increase it in an endogenous 
manner. 
 Putting it very briefly and in a highly simplified way, the southeastern portion of 
Europe has during the entire course of the relevant portion of the recorded history been on the 
periphery of civilizations. In the Old Age it was somehow located between the two principal 
cultural centers – Rome and Constantinople – at a large distance from both of them. In the 
Middle Age it was again somehow in between: Constantinople was again one of the centers 
and thriving Western cities and lands played the role of another center. This part of Europe 
has throughout centuries been and continues to be the periphery of the developed and 
culturally advanced world. The first important element on which this untoward fact had to 
reflect unfavorably was clearly the amount and quality of knowledge and the chances of its 
sustained expansion. Inferiority of knowledge has a bewilderingly wide array of implications, 
the most marked among which are the slow advance of technology, haphazard and growth 
constraining institutional adjustment, as well as slow economic development producing ever 
larger societal welfare and civilizational lags. 
In addition to the described secular distortions and deficiencies, occurring over long 
sweeps of history, one should take note of the purely technical drawbacks producing 
predictable distortions in the allocation of resources. The discrepancies between the images of 
the realities and the realities themselves give rise to multiple equilibria in the technical sense, 
most of which are highly inefficient. A large number of such equilibria produces a large 
probability of the economy getting stuck in one of them and being unable to extricate itself 
out of it even in the long run. Such fatal development entrapments are one of the ways of 
formalizing the depressing phenomenon of the long run stagnation of this part of the world 
over the long stretches of time. 
Another approach to the widespread phenomenon of institutionally conditioned 
stagnation of economies and societies is to acknowledge the public choice (Ekonomska misao 
1998, particularly the Buchanan’s contribution, pp. 167-78), rather than  public interest 
perspective of political processes and to recognize individual and other partial interests as a 
factor determining the formation of institutions. Institutions emerge to a large extent as a 
result of interplay of dominant groups with unequal bargaining power. These groups are not 
motivated by any variety of general interest but by their very concrete separate aspirations. 
Each of the groups strives to further its own interest, but the outcome is the resultant of the 
sum total of actions of all of them. The groups, too, have imperfect and distorted models of 
reality and their moves may not reflect their true interests. To the extent that better moves are 
more beneficial from the point of view of separate group interests – there should exist clear 
motivation to learn as fast as possible so as to avoid counterproductive behavior patterns. In a 
markedly volatile environment, as has been the case in the Southeastern Europe, the chances 
to learn are much smaller than in the more stable environments and the process of formation 
of institutions may verge on something best characterized as chaotic and unpredictable. This 
is why a well founded endogenous theory of institutions is hard to come by anywhere and in turbulent environments of Southeasteuropean type such a theory comes close to being 
impossible. Yet, a few general observations could perhaps be drawn. 
A high concentration of political power, as has largely been the case in Southeastern 
Europe, greatly reduces the measure of control of the rest of society over the politically 
dominating social forces. The situation is akin to the monopoly in the economy – it produces 
the analogous distortions. The events which disperse overly concentrated power are as a rule 
mighty democratizing turnarounds: a divided and differentiated governing elite generates a 
mechanism of internal opposition and imposes behavioral checks on itself. The generally 
highly centralized Southeasteuropean governments have acted as a brake on building 
democratic institutions and slowed down the process of civilizational emancipation. The long 
awaited and perhaps never completely achieved decentralization of the ruling establishment 
profoundly changes not only its mode of functioning but even its motivation structure. The 
behavior directly opposed to what is impressed upon collective memory as the prevailing 
pattern of the non-democratic past becomes politically profitable and imposes itself as a way 
in which the (now) competing political factions increase their public recognition and support. 
To sum up, overly centralized states in Southeastern Europe have greatly impeded the process 
of democratization and, by implication, building of institutional infrastructure for a modern 
market economy. The overdosed governmental interventionism has produced institutional and 
political structures, as well as the configurations of social power, which in a long run context 
prevent democratic emancipation and the institutional adjustments to the needs of the market 
economy. 
  3.6 Institutions, Politics, Ideologies and Culture 
Understanding the failed Southeasteuropean development calls for a close examination 
of all the four elements inserted into the title of this subsection. The changes in physical and 
monetary aggregates depend on the manner of functioning of the market(s) and on the 
unavoidable non-market interventions undertaken in one way or the other by the state. The 
functioning of the market and even the functioning of the government, including the thrust 
and efficiency of a considerable segment of economic and related policies, depends on the 
broad and widely ramified institutional framework. Institutions provide, among other, 
motivation structure, coordination devices and the set of policy instruments whereby 
economic flows can be acted upon in a purposeful way. The institutions themselves are, in 
turn, implanted in another wide and highly indented set of political power relations and the 
resulting processes. Within the set of institutions one distinguishes formal and informal 
institutions, whereby the latter represent a broad framework, a sort of a bedrock of the former. 
Both institutions and, in particular, politics are closely related to and influenced by ideologies 
as “…the subjective perceptions (models, theories) all people possess to explain the world 
around them” (North 1995/1990/, p. 23). Both at the micro level of individual relations and at 
the macro level of group interactions ideologies provide stylized, always highly simplified 
explanations “…colored by normative views of how the world should be organized” (p. 23). 
There is plenty of evidence that the ideas matter a lot and that ideologies deeply affect the 
choices, particularly collective choices made at the higher (and the highest) levels of social 
organization. De Aghion and Ferreira (1995, pp.218-20 and 223-7) made an interesting 
attempt to demonstrate that an implicit and subtly hidden ideology made an important 
contribution to the interpretations and recommendations even of such an intellectually 
influential institution as the World Bank. 
All of the elements mentioned so far – markets and policies, formal and informal 
institutions and ideologies are highly intertwined and partly embedded in each other, such as 
markets in institutions and the formal institutions in the informal ones. But all of these are 
embedded in something even broader and more general, a medium hard to delineate and along 
many dimensions simply diffuse. That expansive and all-pervasive medium is the culture. North (1995/1990/, p. 37) sees culture as “…socially transmitted information and …a part of 
heritage” affecting deeply the way in which the mind processes information. In offering a 
more formal definition North relies on Boyd and Richerson and determines culture as “the 
transmission from one generation to the next , via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, 
values, and other factors that influence behavior”. Culture is a wide and deep universe in 
which developmental processes and all kinds of social change take place. It embraces just 
about everything and affects in many ways and decisively all developments that characterize a 
society and predetermine its economic and, more broadly, civilizational destiny. 
These considerations make it possible to visualize a complex, even though not quite 
symmetric, hierarchy. Hierarchy is defined through the idea of embedment. Thus, markets are 
embedded in institutions, so that, e.g. it appears impossible to arrive at a set of regularly 
functioning and efficient markets without a whole range of institutions, including in particular 
a well ordered and independent judiciary. Depending on the availability of historical time, 
especially on whether one can identify the Gerschenkronian syndrome of latecomers, only a 
part of institutions can grow out spontaneously. Spontaneous formation of institutions takes 
much time. Southeastern Europe is a conspicuous latecomer and it has not had time to let and 
see a spontaneous, evolutionary growth of institutions. The amount of social engineering, 
needed or otherwise, was in Southeastern Europe relatively much higher than in the now 
developed parts of Europe. That fact has made her institutional development highly uneven, 
occasionally perverted and always extremely hazardous. Social engineering stumbles up 
against a formidable constraint: the lack of knowledge to conceptualize, design and 
implement big changes in organization at the level of large segments of the economy end 
society and at the level of the system as a whole. Latecomers are simply incited to, and even 
forced into, excessive amount of social engineering. The trouble with such a strategy is a high 
probability of breakdowns and catastrophes. Such catastrophes did happen to 
Southeasteuropean countries more frequently than elsewhere. One should think of the Greek 
state bankruptcies or the tragic Serbian destiny in the course of the First World War. The 
latter can be  seen as a consequence of the overly ambitious approach to building the 
nationhood and the political, military and institutional engineering associated to it. The 
epochal demise of the socialist socio-economic system  is the most recent example of the 
overall, systemic catastrophe. 
The real trouble with overdosed engineering, which regularly comes in combination 
with severe limitations on the available knowledge and insurmountable constraints on 
information gathering and processing, is that only a small subset out of a large and versatile 
collection of all kinds of institutions can be acted upon in any socially meaningful way. Such 
are, of course, legally formalized institutions in the form of various statutory arrangements. 
Such arrangements are either enacted in the parliament or formally brought in other 
authorized bodies of the most broadly defined state. The difficulties arise in connection with 
an obvious impossibility to act upon other institutions, whose informal character makes them 
inaccessible to the political authorities. The last spectacular, and spectacularly unsuccessful, 
attempt to shape in a planned and conscious way the immense sea of informal institutions was 
the “Great” Cultural Revolution in China. Experience has proven the impossibility of 
engineering of the vast and muddled array of informal institutions, not to speak of the of the 
hard-to-delimit and fuzzy quicksand of customs, mores and habits of thinking known under 
the common name of culture.  
Khan /1995, p. 71) introduces the idea of the performance ranking of institutions being 
specific to the political settlements within which the institutions operate. This could be seen 
as a manifestation of the fact that political settlements are a matter of choice on a higher level 
and that these choices predetermine the type of institutions appropriate to them. It is as if the 
alternative institutional arrangements are classified into several subsets and that each choice of settlement uniquely determines the subset out of which the arrangements can be chosen. 
Given the choice of the settlement, the subsets of arrangements are neither interchangeable 
nor marginally substitutable. That would further imply that efficiency of various sets of 
institutions could not be measured with the same yardstick. Each arrangement could be 
evaluated only with respect to its own political framework in which it is embedded. The 
peasant holdings in some Indian region, socially stratified into a system of castes could not be 
compared with the American farms which are an outgrowth of an individualistic, equalitarian 
political structure characterizing democratic political organization.  
The specificity of institutions to broader political arrangements puts into a broader 
perspective the strategic issues of governance and its timely or otherwise adjustments to 
changing circumstances. If, say, kinship ties modify essentially the functioning of the market 
and if they are a sort of a choice variable of higher order – a kind of meta quantity – then the 
efficiency of the market can only be evaluated within the class of arrangements corresponding 
to that meta choice and compatible with it. Political settlements in, turn, are embedded into 
culture as a much broader category, even though they are far from being uniquely determined 
by it. This is, again, the way in which culture enters not only as a determinant of institutions, 
but even as a qualifier in the difficult task of their evaluation. It turns out that to the hierarchy 
of choices there corresponds a hierarchy of evaluations. One comes up against another 
conceptual difficulty in evaluating the alternative institutional arrangements: they turn out 
incomparable as a matter of principle. This just adds on the already identified difficulty 
connected with the trade-offs: looking just on economic performance is narrow and one-sided 
because the institutions, in addition to securing some level of economic efficiency, have 
additional important tasks, such as national security or lasting peace among the neighbors. 
The relevance of the distinction between the productive, wealth augmenting behavior, 
on the one, and the redistributive, rent seeking behavior, on the other hand, is evidently 
beyond any dispute. The two kinds of behavior spring out of the corresponding – functional or 
dysfunctional  – institutional arrangements. The question to be investigated is whether the 
division between the productive and the rent seeking behavior cuts across meta choices of 
political settlements and even wider choices of broad cultural patterns. The point to note is, 
however, that this or that type of behavior is not only a matter of the current motivation 
structure but is also learned in the course of time. The exploitative orientations and practices 
are thus only partly determined by the current motivational mechanisms; the other important 
determinant is the culture itself. A further point to note is that the eventual introduction of the 
transparent, performance rewarding, and thus fair institutional arrangements requires, as noted 
by Stein (1995, p. 113), a change in the mode of thinking. Clarifying the property relations, as 
a strategy of institutional straightening of the society implies therefore a change of culture and 
possibly turns out to be dependent on it. Again, reshaping institutions is much more than just 
adjusting the laws. The changes have to cut much deeper into social fabric. If they don’t and if 
they don’t do it in the right way, the entire venture of engineering the desired institutional 
order is likely to falter and ultimately to fail. The relevance to Southeastern Europe – and, 
indeed, to both its historical experience and to the crossroads at which she finds itself now – 
should be apparent.  
  3.7 Some Region-Specific Determinants of Culture 
The volatility of the economic and social environment due to a far above average 
exposure to external shocks has been identified as the key distinguishing trait of the 
Southeastern Europe, a feature that sets it apart from the rest of the continent. The historical 
turbulence has made it both impossible and unattractive to invest into institution building and 
to strive to a set of lasting and stable rules of economic and social game. The disarray in the 
institutional sphere and some fuzziness of the public perception as to what types of behavior 
are to be adhered to have emerged as a predictable result. Serious coordination problems and an overall lowering of the efficiency of all economic and non-economic processes has come 
out as an ultimate consequence. The same can be said about the culture as a most general 
class of phenomena in which formal and informal institutions are embedded. The historical 
turbulence makes it impossible for a set of lasting and recognizable cultural patterns to be 
organically formed and, particularly, to stabilize and to start functioning as a most general 
orientation in designing and adjusting the human action. Notably important is the fact that a 
stable culture has not existed as a means of coordinating the bewildering multitude of moves 
of the widest possible variety of actors in an unavoidably  – at least to some extent  – 
decentralized  decisionmaking environment. One might safely hypothesize that such 
numerous and conspicuous attempts at centralization in the underdeveloped countries could 
have been the result of the absence of coordinating devices of formal and, particularly, 
informal institutions. But even more than from the inadequate institutions the urge toward the 
prominent centralization could have resulted from the absence of the coordinating workings 
of culture. 
 The largely ephemeral character and the fuzziness of cultural patterns is one of the 
determining peculiarities of Southeastern Europe and, at the same time and therefore, a 
singularly idiosyncratic reason of her underdevelopment. Having relatively stable institutions 
and the set of cultural patterns as a wider medium embedding them is an indisputable 
advantage. This is not to say that an excessive stability bordering on the lack of change is an 
ideal to be striven to, an undeniable blessing. The other extreme, the lack of change and 
flexibility, is equally damaging because it prevents timely adjustments. But the epochal 
trouble of Southeastern Europe has steadily been the excess of exogenous shocks and of 
brutally forced change which prevented her to enjoy reasonable spells of peace and tranquility 
needed to form a set of formalized institutions, ethical standards, customs and patterns of 
belief and thought which would, taken together and seen in all of their complexity and 
interdependence, provide a basis for a better conceived, more coherent and, therefore, more 
effective action at all levels of social organization. 
It has also been established that, due to the long centuries of alien rule, the unyielding 
tradition of contempt for law and the refusal to respect it has evolved in Southeastern Europe. 
That alone is sufficient to make both decentralized decision making and societal policies ill-
coordinated, anemic and ineffective. As laws are among the most significant coordinating 
devices, the inimical reception of laws leads directly into the nexus of chaotic interactions and 
dire inefficiency. The rejection of laws also favors pervasive rent seeking and all kinds of 
redistributive behavior. It is only through the laws and the analogous informal institutions that 
people and organizations are prevented from appropriating what rightly belongs to others – 
having, after all, been produced by them – and, at the same time, turn to productive behavior 
as the only way of raising their wealth and welfare. Cultural stereotypes are significant as the 
deep going, fundamental mainspring of laws and the determinant of their general orientation 
and quality. This is why, in inquiring about the causes of the wealth of nations, one has, 
among other, to delve into their spiritual texture, their thought patterns and their deep-seated 
value orientations.  
Evolving of mental constructs and habits of thinking favoring productive rather than 
redistributive behavior is one of the avenues leading into the successful ventures of sustained 
increase of the wealth of nations. In addition to the degree of fostering the productive action, 
another quality of the subjective models of reality (mental constructs) of utmost importance 
is, clearly, the degree of correspondence to the reality itself. In Southeastern Europe this 
correspondence, conditionally speaking, the level of truth, has generally been noticeably low. 
That alone accounts for a great deal of inefficiency. With high costs of the control system (the 
transaction costs) the need arises to create institutions to reduce uncertainty through collecting 
and organizing information, which is also a way of correcting the models of reality and arriving at a more accurate approximation to the truth. But, again, with frequent changes 
exogenously forced upon the system it is not possible to revise the models. It is not even 
profitable to generate new knowledge as the objects to which the knowledge refers are not 
likely to last sufficiently long. As a consequence, the old models, despite being grossly 
inadequate, stubbornly persist. The curiosity of the phenomenon is that sticking to the dated, 
evidently imperfect models may prove a quite rational decision since the benefits of 
correcting the model would not roll long enough  to justify the investment into revising the 
model. The slow and incompletely adjustable model of realities does not provide a sound 
basis for timely and rational institutional adjustment and that, of course, turns out to be a 
steady and powerful source of inefficiency. In the last analysis, frequent exogenously induced 
changes make for a generally much lower level of efficiency  – how ever it appears to be 
defined – as compared to more stable and gradually evolving environments. 
In addition to discouraging the acquisition of knowledge in general, the exogenously 
disturbed and highly volatile situation in the Southeastern Europe has profoundly influenced 
the type of knowledge acquired. More favored were the pieces of knowledge likely to have 
short-term relevance and less attractive was the knowledge promising solutions of a long run 
nature. As the character and structure of knowledge strongly affect the directions of 
institutional change, this relation, too, favored slow institutional adjustment. But adjusting 
slowly and incompletely solves in a way the problems in a shorter term perspective at the cost 
of a permanent and dangerously widening cognitive discrepancy. The discrepancy translates 
into the gap between the institutional structure as a whole and the underlying resource and 
technology base of the society. The incidence of the gap becoming a recurrent feature of 
social development is only to be expected; one is entitled to speak about  gaps as an 
accompanying trait of the social change in Southeasteuropean  lands. Such threatening gaps 
prepare the ground for massive compensatory adjustments, i. e. revolutions. The revolutions, 
again, have their own hazards connected once more with the scarcity of knowledge. No 
society has sufficient knowledge and information to design to any degree of adequacy and 
safety spectacular jumps in its organization. The high likelihood of catastrophe is the price of 
the accumulated failed institutional adjustments, which then call for a very big compensating 
adjustment. As was noted  in the preceding section, such catastrophes did occur in 
Southeastern Europe and the danger is far from fictitious. 
Once the society settles with a thin and meagre basis of knowledge and opts for the 
corresponding inadequate institutions, the untoward situation tends to perpetuate itself. The 
social strata benefiting from the perverse (inducing rent seeking rather than productive 
behavior) institutions gradually come into existence and turn into powerful social force 
interested in perpetuating the socially  irrational arrangements. Moreover, the process of 
institution building – though to considerable extent decentralized, particularly at the level of 
informal institutions – cannot rely prevailingly on the decentralized initiative. Institutions by 
their very  nature concern and affect a large number of actors. Huge externalities are an 
expected and unavoidable consequence of the multiple and complex interconnectedness of the 
actors through the institutions. Institutions also, once formed, provide guidance and 
coordination signals to many agents covering large segments of economic and, generally, 
social activity. Thus, a marked phenomenon of indivisibility occurs as well. Other types of 
decision making imperfections of decentralized processes of institution building can easily be 
identified. It can be safely concluded that the decentralized mechanism of institution building 
is fraught with the full range of imperfections, and, indeed, to much higher extent than the 
ordinary economic processes occupying so much the attention of economic theorists.  
As Adelman argues to some detail (1995, p. 247), collective action is imminent even 
in the early stages of formation of any institutions, the state steps in and adopting constraints 
on the behavior and accompanying standards of conduct turns unavoidably into a political process. The theory of state, more than the theory of decentralized decision making, becomes 
relevant to the explanation of the process of institution building. That conclusion, in turn, ties 
in with the empirical fact that the governments in the Southeastern Europe have, as a rule, 
been primitive, anachronic, corrupt and rent seeking. Inefficient government seems to have 
been a part of general underdevelopment of the Southeasteuopean societies. With stunted 
governments – which, among other, have obsolete and generally inadequate knowledge one 
can’t expect impressive performance in forming and actualizing rationally structured and 
socially useful institutions. The full circle seems to have been completed. 
Relating the overall efficiency to the congruence of the institutional framework and 
the underlying resource and the technology base brings into the forefront the need for timely 
institutional adjustment. As noted above, the discrepancy between institutions, on the one, and 
technological and resource configurations, on the other hand, cannot but be considered a 
source of economic waste and overall inefficiency. For the reasons elaborated above, 
Southeastern Europe has suffered an extraordinary institutional rigidity. It has suffered from a 
dangerous malaise which, following the North’s (1995, p. 26) terminology, could be 
diagnosed as the lack of adaptive efficiency. Dragging ostensibly behind the events has been 
the cause of abysmally low performance all over Southeastern Europe, but it has at the same 
time been the consequence of too large a number of these events, of their largely exogenous 
nature and, above all, of their shocking and destructive character. The sources of the 
improvements of the economic lot of Southeastern Europe are evidently in the improvement 
of the adaptive efficiency as much as they are in the enhancing of conventional allocative 
efficiency. 
  3.8 Idiosyncratic Nature of Institutional and Social Change 
The unfavorable initial state and the constraints on the improvements along various 
dimensions of institutional development are closely associated to and largely the 
consequences of the peculiar way in which institutional transformation, as well as social 
change in general proceed in the not quite usual circumstances of Southeastern Europe. 
Throughout her turbulent history this region of Europe has been rocked by a series of rarely 
interrupted and, at the same time, powerful and destructive exogenously generated shocks. 
These shocks have, of course, produced frequent and deep-going changes, but such changes 
have been forced upon the region, divorced from the regional objectives and policies and, by 
implication, out of line with social needs and preferences of the relevant participants. Thus, a 
strange combination of excessive volatility and institutional and social rigidity came out as a 
final result. The situation has been distinctly changeable as far as the exogenous sources of 
variation are concerned and, in a curious way rigid, as far as the changes consciously induced 
from within are concerned. There have been many changes imposed from outside and 
exceedingly few changes initiated from within. Historical evidence corroborates this 
proposition. The major changes are associated with externally imposed, often traumatic 
shocks and modernizing changes engineered through deliberate policies are sparse and 
cautious. The resistance to change can be easily discerned from the wide fields of national 
culture: it is well known that practically the entire XIXth century Serbian literature is 
extremely conservative, inimical to innovations and prominently laden with nostalgia for 
some sort of a “golden past” (Skerlic 1934/1910/). The marked conservative bend of the entire 
national culture has become a sort  of an invariant of its long run development and has 
survived up until the present time. A recent analysis offers persuasive argumentation of its 
giving undeletable imprint to the present state of mind of the society at large, as well as  being 
simultaneously responsible for the tragic ethnic conflicts in the course of the last decade and 
the bloody disintegration of the former Yugoslavia (Jovanovic 2001). Such an orientation is 
rather easy to explain by invoking the fact that changes in the past have, as a rule, been very 
painful and traumatic and that they as such have left deep markings in the collective memory. It is only natural for any collectivity energetically to reject whatever has produced painful 
experiences in the past and to develop a sort of conditional reflex manifesting itself through a 
sustained defense against all noticeable changes.  The same syndrome of distinctly low 
receptivity for changes has much more concretely and with persuasive empirical evidence 
been observed in the last decade, whereby the lack of readiness for change has been pointed 
out as a possible explanation for the slow unfolding of reforms (Madzar 2000). An additional 
reason for the rejection of changes has to do with uncertainty. If changes are frequent, large 
and exogenously driven, they are necessarily unpredictable and the general atmosphere 
largely created by them is the one of extreme uncertainty. As a consequence, the rate at which 
future benefits, resulting from the change, are discounted is very high and the cost-benefit 
analyses of the desirability of changes are likely to give negative verdicts.  
Endogeneity of institutional change, which can be established only in a broader 
political economy approach, is still another reason for institutional rigidities of the 
Southeasteuropean societies. Institutions produce, or decisively influence, a certain pattern of 
development, which affects the social structure (the “class structure”) with accompanying 
configuration of power relationships among the most influential social g roups. The 
distribution of power is the basis of political processes grinding out the changes in the 
existing institutional order which again produces further political changes through underlying 
impact on the rhythm and pattern of development. Among the groups with especially strong 
influence on the reshaping (or preserving) the inherited institutions the most prominent 
appears to be the business community, which has frequently wrought out particular changes 
(or lack of them) in both institutions and policies. Such was the case in Indonesia after 1870, 
when the business community, having been averse to governmental interventionism, had 
forced the government to adopt visibly more liberal economic policies (Booth 1995, p. 289). 
The cycle institutions–development patterns–power relationships–political process–
institutions is thus closed and with resistance to change, generated by typical 
Southeasteuropean turbulences, the cycle may acquire tough stability repeating itself over and 
over again. The societies are thus locked in with a set of practically unchanging institutional 
arrangements and with low ability to adjust even to the crucial changes in resources and 
technology. 
The stochastic component in the institutional development should not pass unnoticed. 
It weaves into the institutional change at all links of the chain making the cycle described in 
the preceding paragraph. But the most likely location at which the described developments 
take on a pronounced random character is the economic development whose stochastic 
disturbances produce changes in income distribution and power relationships and, further on, 
the political changes with unmistakable institutional reflections.  
As a matter of highly versatile mechanisms through which they are generated, 
institutional changes can and do come about spontaneously, a feature which takes on the 
character of a general law when it comes down to the informal rules. However, the 
spontaneous formation of institutions requires much more time than there was available in 
Southeastern Europe. Frequent and deep going changes in the environment did not allow 
sufficient time for the institutional changes to be gradually shaped, nor did they leave 
sufficiently long time horizons to reap the resulting benefits and to recuperate the costs of 
change. Consequently, the government had to step in and to take over the hazardous task of 
modeling the institutions. The formal institutions had by the logic of the environmental 
turbulence to take a much more important role than in the societies less shaken by the external 
traumatic shocks. But that in turn meant that the quality of governmental intervention had to 
surface as the decisive determinant of the quality of institutions. Mali corvi malum ovum: that 
simply led to the only imaginable situation in which a poor government could have produced 
only an equally poor institutional (dis)order. The government, far from being equal to the historical task confronted on the eve of modernization, became the institutional destiny of the 
Southeasteuropean countries. The institutional failure largely overlapped with the failure of 
the government as an institution charged, among other, with the institutional reconstruction of 
Southeasteuropean societies. 
Khan (1995) speaks of two types of governmental failure. He terms them the failure of 
type I and the failure of type II. The type I failure is defined as badly designed or even 
detrimental governmental  action. Type II failure is defined as the set of undesirable 
consequences of the government’s  inaction. A m ajor portion of the set of the type I 
government’s failures has to do with the rent-seeking. The rent-seeking is, as it were, a 
balancing item of the transaction costs. Transaction costs are the principal source of the 
market failure, while rent seeking seems to be the chief determinant of the government 
failure. Transaction costs, wherever present, prevent gainful transactions. Rent seeking, on the 
other hand, prevents the government – burdened with the narrow, particularistic interests – 
from designing and implementing socially desirable policies (say, Pareto efficient actions in 
the sense of Buchanan’s Pareto relevant externalities in Buchanan and Stubblebine 
1987/1962/: amounting to improving the lot of some actor(s) without deteriorating the 
position of anyone else in the system). The trouble with the rent seeking is that it does not 
reduce to just transferring income from one set of economic agents to another. In attempting 
to wring out income from those who have already created it, special – if merely redistributive 
–  activities have to be undertaken and the real resources have to be expended. Moreover, the 
easily seen allocative losses are incurred on both ends of the exploitative redistributive 
relation: the one that is hurt will exert himself less and the one who benefits will reduce his 
endeavor to create new value. The fact that some arrangements, while implying rent seeking 
in the area in which they operate, might reduce the transaction costs in another segment (or 
dimension!) in the system (Khan 1995, p. 75) – just further complicates both the analysis and 
the situation, probably augmenting the hazard of further losses on account of both market 
allocation and the governmental regulation. 
In actual institution building processes the decision criteria for selection from among 
available alternatives are not macroeconomic and social but particularistic and group oriented. 
Institutions are not there to foster the increase of (defined the way one likes) social welfare, 
but to meet the interest of the competing groups. Those with the maximum bargaining (and 
otherwise) power will be in the position to adjust institutions to their narrow interests. In the 
Southeastern Europe that has traditionally been the state bureaucracy (Markovic 1946/1872/, 
p. 74 and ch. VIII). Consequently, the government has turned into a huge and mighty 
instrument of brutal across-the-board exploitation. The basic, in a way defining line of class 
division of these societies had become the one setting bureaucracy against the rest of the 
society. A telling illustration of this statement is the fact that the number of government’s 
officials per 10,000 inhabitants was in Greece in 1907 roughly seven times higher than in 
Britain (Minoglou 1995, p. 263). In such broader social constellations, characterized above all 
by the governmental violence and brute force, it would be a miracle if a reasonably rational 
path of institutional development emerged. 
  3.9 Further Obstacles to Institutional Improvements 
There have undoubtedly been many possibilities of institutional improvements in the 
Pareto sense. But they have not been realized in the muddled constellations of social 
relationships of the permanently rocked and incessantly disturbed Southeastern Europe. 
Abstractly speaking, this could not have happened as the winners of any Pareto efficient 
change could have compensated the losers. Assuming for a moment that all relevant groups 
benefited from the proposed change and that the compensations were not needed, the lack of 
change could have been explained by the absence and/or the inadequacy of knowledge. But 
the crucially important fact is that the side payments have not been either offered or accepted (cf. Khan 1995, p. 81). The problem is, at least partly, reduced to the failure to institute the 
payments and the question arises about the reasons of such failure. One possible answer, 
applicable not only to the present but also to the more distant past, is offered by 
Buchanan(1995/1991/). Buchanan speaks of the possibility of reform beneficiaries organizing 
themselves or accepting the idea of being additionally taxed to provide the financial means to 
compensate the losers. Since the politically induced and government engineered arbitrary 
redistributions reduce value and since the removal of these arbitrary encroachments on the 
market valuation would evidently increase value, there should be great motivation on both 
sides to reform the economy by eliminating political violence imposed upon it. That would be 
achieved through implied increase of wealth which would make everyone better off. 
Buchanan explains the absence of such market enhancing, value generating interventions by 
the unwillingness on the side of both potential winners and the losers to agree to them. The 
losers might hope to be able to form a majority coalition in the future and win what rightly 
belongs to them without having to bribe the beneficiaries of the arbitrarily imposed, 
politically implemented schemes of redistribution. The winners might have contrary 
expectations amounting to strong belief to remain able to preserve their political supremacy. 
The inconsistent, mutually opposed expectations in the political process thus appear as a 
factor preserving the contrived, quite arbitrary distributional arrangements and therefore 
inefficient allocational outcomes in the economy (Buchanan 1995/1991/, pp. 241-2).  
While this reasoning may to some extent be applicable to Southeastern Europe, 
another factor appears to be much more important. The major winner in the politically created 
distortions  in the sphere of distribution has been the governmental bureaucracy itself. The 
Southeasteuropean countries have not been in the position of having two or, perhaps, more 
sides involved in the distributional conflict and attempting to achieve their goals in the 
balanced and unbiased political competition, with neutral government ready to serve whoever 
comes out as the winner from this battle. Quite to the contrary, one of the competing sides has 
government on its side – or, better to say, is the government – and the chances of striking a 
deal leading to Pareto improvements, i. e. the chances of engineering meaningful reforms are 
thereby reduced to nothing. In a society dominated by the bureaucracy and the government 
the reforms in the style of Buchanan are almost bound to turn out to be impossible. The usual 
remedy against arbitrary political redistributions are constitutional constraints, growing 
organically in the course of (long) time and reflecting the wisdom of ages and generations. 
But that is exactly what has been missing in the institutional and social development of 
Southeasteuropean countries: the Proustian quest for the lost time has been a regime of 
functioning of the societies which has never allowed sufficient time for such constraints to be 
formed and strengthened. Moreover, with a mighty government and all other social forces 
weak and stunted, such constraints, even if they somehow come to be formalized, do not bind 
those who are in control of the electoral body instead of being controlled by it. The chances of 
separating the distributional feuds from the wealth augmenting market exchanges are slim 
indeed in such an environment and the allocational distortions, reducing the welfare of 
everyone are likely to persist. 
The destiny of Southeasteuropean countries is akin to the destiny of the large majority 
of underdeveloped countries in that they are locked in an institutional universe which prevents 
growth and modernization and differs substantially and deeply when compared to the 
institutional arrangements of the developed countries. The situation could be termed and 
understood as an institutional trap out of which there does not appear to be an easy, or any for 
that matter, escape. The dysfunctional institutional setup is cemented by the particularistic 
interests whose perverse equilibrium could turn out stable even if the forces constituting it do 
not have the command over the government as the institution legally endowed with the 
monopoly of violence. But having the control over the government makes the incorrigible institutional equilibrium even more stable. A double interdependence gets established: 
distorted institutions give ample food to entrenched particularistic interests and those interests 
further act as a powerful force solidifying such institutions.  
The potential choices are further constrained by monopolies other than the just 
mentioned monopoly over the government’s apparatus. The monopoly over information and 
the information generating and disseminating mechanisms are among the most powerful and 
far-reaching. Clearly, no effective, goal-achieving decisions can be taken without reliable and 
truthful information. Controlling information gives a handle – though an indirect one – on the 
decisions being based on it. Control of minds is thus superimposed upon the coercive physical 
control of bodies. Managing information also makes it possible to influence effectively the 
degree to which certain segments of the society can organize themselves in an attempt to 
defend their interests against bureaucratic encroachments. Reduced organizational capacity, 
achieved through the manipulation of information, greatly handicaps the nascent 
emancipation movements and perpetuates the power holders in their cemented positions. 
In particular, the governmental machinery is used by the bureaucracy to bring under 
its control the mightiest levers of the control over the economy. These have traditionally been 
the state monopolies over some basic necessities and a number of articles with very low 
elasticity of demand,  the foreign trade licensing on both export and import side, 
administrative control of certain price together with the privilege to ration the corresponding 
commodities whose markets are thrown out of equilibrium and, more frequently than not, 
extensive and complex controls over foreign exchange flows. Putting large enterprises, the 
collection of which is by no means reduced to natural monopolies, under governmental direct 
control has also been one of the traditional handles on the economy and the society at large. 
This, of course, gave the state bureaucracy the control over a considerable number of the top 
managerial positions, as well as the lower level jobs. The latter has been and still remains 
significant in the economies with structural disequilibria in the factor markets. In such 
markets the mobility of labor is drastically reduced or nonexistent, competition does not 
equalize the prices for resources of equal productivity and getting hold of particular jobs is a 
clear privilege. Whoever has the control over such jobs has a mighty tool to control the 
people’s destinies. The command over financial flows gives the incumbent political forces a 
great advantage over their political competitors, the political scene becomes asymmetric in the 
sense of having a dominant force prevailing over all other factions and the entire political 
system becomes overly rigid. The resulting situation of the political establishment controlling 
the electoral body instead of being controlled by it means the end of democracy despite all the 
formal attributes of the standard multiparty arrangement. 
Despite the powerful conservative forces and numerous political currents working for 
the preservation of the status quo, it occasionally happens that the entire petrified structure 
collapses and the system shifts to a new equilibrium. This could be called a revolution or a 
revolution-like turnaround. Few general propositions can be given concerning such epochal 
political shifts, but Southeastern Europe is the place to watch for some common  features of 
these spectacular transformations and to draw at least tentative generalizations. The recent 
momentous demise of the socialist institutional setup is a case in point: this part of Europe 
was severely shaken by this global concussion. The cause of the political change seems to rest 
with the overall change of the political balance. The messy, grossly inefficient, largely 
exploitative societal superstructure collapses because all concerned turn out destitute losers 
and even its beneficiaries lose interest to defend it against the opposition to the regime. The 
seeds of the destruction of such forceful, exploitative arrangements are as a rule contained in 
their inefficiency and, indeed, in their infancy. The lack of efficiency condemns it to the loss 
of support of its even the most ardent supporters. The system with no relevant political 
factions and no significant social forces to defend it evidently cannot have a future. The trouble with such pattern of social change is the late coming and the very magnitude of such 
change for which adequate knowledge and sufficient information cannot be accumulated. 
Again, the risk is too high, the ability to counter it is manifestly incommensurate with the 
hazard and the likelihood of the catastrophe (again) continues to loom large. The Southeastern 
Europe is a region of ruins and downfalls. That sets it apart in relation to the rest of Europe. 
That untoward fact surfaces as one of the key causes of its institutional weaknesses and its 
belated civilizational emancipation. 
3.10 The Process of Institutional Change: The Constraints and Determinants of 
         Deviations 
The purpose of this section is to elucidate a number of factors constraining and 
deflecting the change – the factors which might be taken as a preliminary to the now popular 
notion of path dependence. Path dependence is an analytical construct of rather recent origin 
(cf. Dalago 1999, pp. 110-17), but there is no difficulty in applying it to the past 
developments and to use it as an instrument of research and exegesis of the modernization 
failures in the past and their deep behavioral and civilizational roots. Path dependence deals 
with those institutionally induced aspects of behavior which are related to the changes of the 
institutions themselves and, in particular, relates to the impediments to change and the 
peculiar, not necessarily desirable directions of change. Thinking in terms of institutions 
affecting their own future development takes on a truly general significance and leads one to 
the conclusion that, as far as the economy is concerned, the past can be made intelligible only 
as a story of institutional evolution (Harris  et al. 1995, p. 10). The choice of the new 
institutions, i. e. the path of institutional development itself, is deeply affected by the fact that 
such choice has to be made within the existing institutional setup inherited from the past. The 
initial state acquires a particular significance in this context, too, as a determinant of the 
feasible choice of the future states and an important factor influencing the whatever concrete 
future state is arrived at. The market structure, the factor price ratios, the level of land rents 
and interest rates, the degree and type of taxation, income distribution and its possible 
exploitative distortions, the orientation of economic and other policies, the general philosophy 
of the state action and its role in the society – all of these and many other elements are the 
attributes of the initial state influencing significantly the dynamics of the system and the path 
of institutional transformation.  
A part of the institutional structure are the rules of changing the rules. As the higher 
order rules are predominantly state engineered, the process is by the nature of its structural 
foundations strongly affected by the fact that it leans on the coercive power of the state and 
makes it possible for some subsets of economic agents to extract resources from the rest of the 
society. This is where one-sided involuntary interventions impinge upon the market 
transaction, divorcing the distribution from the production and creating distortions that reduce 
value and annihilate wealth. This is why institution building necessarily spills over into the 
province of the governmental intervention, while the change ceases t o be economic and 
becomes eminently political. This appears to be especially true in traditionally bureaucratic 
and government dominated region of Southeastern Europe, where the state has been 
demonstrating a strong inclination to intervene routinely even into the fields which manifestly  
do not belong to it. 
Until some two decades ago there prevailed a romantic and obviously naïve view that 
institutional development can only unfold in the form of the institutional progress. The view 
relied on – as it came to be revealed, truly impressionistic – belief that life itself had dealt on a 
permanent basis verdicts on various institutional arrangements and, as a consequence, the 
survival of the fittest had to be at work. That, however, has not been the case: the world is 
overpopulated by institutions which leave so much to be desired, at least from an economist’s 
point of view. In fact, some  seemingly absurd and intolerable institutions persisted over long series of decades and centuries. The question naturally arose as to why these monstrosities 
persist and, again, Southeastern Europe is the region particularly inspiring such thoughts and 
bewilderments. 
The answers are many and this section, despite being entirely devoted to them, will 
not cover them in an exhaustive way. The first, not necessarily the most important, is the 
conformity. The prevailing mores  are shared by many people and are deeply ingrained in 
their way of thinking. All have invested in learning the existing habits and, once having 
mastered them, are disinclined to invest again time, effort and resources to learn a new set of 
rules. Being deeply ingrained in the social conscience, these rules acquire a certain ethical 
significance and weight. Going against the commonly shared rules becomes offensive and 
carries the risk of castigation and ostracism. Consuetudo est altera natura and the threat of 
punishment and ostracism makes it individually unattractive to make any attempts to modify 
them. Sticking to the prevailing rules becomes thus individually r ational irrespective of 
possible social gains and big global effects derivable from an eventual overhaul of the entire 
set of the behavioral standards. This seems to be a clear case of a contradiction between the 
logic of the individual choice and the rationality from the broader societal point of view.  
In Southeastern Europe the degree of conformity has probably been much higher and 
this conflict much more profound because of her distinct collectivist tradition. Much has been 
written on the syndrome of collectivism in the past and a great revival of this line of thinking 
occurred in the context of the study of transition and of alternative paths of modernizing the 
ex-socialist societies (Sekulovic et al. 1997, pp. 401-6). Social genotype is widely believed to 
have been forged in the spirit of collectivist value orientations. In fact,  collectivism can be 
seen as a rational response, a true survival characteristic of the Southeasteuropean societies 
which spent a good deal of their history under the alien rule and in such circumstances faced 
the hazard of being swept off from the historical scene. Security has under such conditions 
had to be the principal individual and collective preoccupation and institutions had to adjust to 
that fundamental need and to reflect the urge to survive in face of the existential threats. The 
threats were both physical  – amounting to the risk of extermination  – and cultural  – 
converting the population to Islam and forcing it to lose its national identity. Security and 
defense are  clear cases of pronounced external economies and public goods. Protection 
against the enemy is best secured by joining forces with all who are on the same side of the 
battle line and who face the same existential threat. While individual arrangements may be the 
best from the point of view of economic efficiency, it is clear that collective solutions are 
superior when it comes down to defend life and body and, particularly, to preserve ethnic or 
national identity. If and when security matters more than efficiency, it is desirable and rational 
for collectivism to prevail. Economic efficiency is sacrificed to a higher need and the 
institutional order turns out optimal in a generalized perspective despite being inferior in the 
light of much narrower criteria of economic efficiency. The evaluation of institutions being 
conditional on the broader political settlements comes here on its own. 
Before turning to the path dependence sensu stricto, it is apposite to briefly review a 
few other factors accounting for the s ocieties sticking to evidently imperfect and even 
irrational institutions. The  first reason of such institutional conservatism is the above 
mentioned configuration of particularistic interests of various groups. Institutions are to a 
significant extent the resultant of the global interplay of the powerful effectuations of such 
interests, whereby the groups don’t strive to forge socially beneficial institutions but try to 
wrench out the devices that suit best their narrow interests. Institutions thus don’t reflect how 
ever defined social rationality but the concrete constellations of power relationships among 
the relevant groups. Secondly, the seeming irrationality of institutions may turn out spurious. 
No society can have separate institutions for separate n eeds and, being largely indivisible, 
institutions serve a broad and diversified set of needs simultaneously. Some needs may have an equal or even higher priority than economic necessities. While serving simultaneously 
other needs, institutions may actually be poor in the narrow economic perspective despite 
being optimal in the broader context of all needs they happen to serve. One such need was 
separately treated in the preceding paragraph. Thirdly, institutions are frequently contorted in 
order to effect certain coercive redistributions which could not be achieved through other, 
more transparent means (Buchanan 1995/1991/, p. 244). Institutions thus serve as a 
camouflage for redistributional encroachments to the benefit of particularistic groups and at 
the cost of the rest of the society. Fourthly, the unappealing movement of the system through 
the space of alternative institutional arrangements could be a simple result of the constraints 
embedded in the initial state: the directions of institutional change which might be perceived 
as desirable may simply be infeasible or the costs of transition associated with them might 
exceed the expected benefits and the change might not pass the simple cost-benefit test.  
A part of constraints are those relating to cognitive capacity and information: the 
relevant actors may simply not be able to design and may not know how to implement the 
changes perceived as desirable.  Mutatis mutandis, the same goes for information. It is 
important to note in this context that many changes which might look perfectly conceivable 
and implementable in an ex post perspective could actually be beyond the reach of the feasible 
in the relevant  ex ante perspective when the needed actions had to be planned and the 
accompanying decisions taken. This is the context in which two sets of factors brought out by 
Dallago (1999, pp. 116-7) deserve mentioning. Firstly, network externalities and strategic 
complementarities make for multiple equilibria all of which cannot be equally attractive, no 
matter what evaluative criteria are chosen. Secondly, with limited cognitive capacity and 
distorted mental models the relevant agents are not able to locate the superior equilibria; quite 
to the contrary, being forced to rely on the past experiences and the sloppy generalizations of 
what data they had been able to record and preserve from the past, they chose options closely 
located within their narrow intellectual horizon and miss the opportunities offered by distant 
global optima.  
Cognitive imperfections resulting in multiple equilibria could, as a matter of principle, 
be ameliorated by intensifying various forms of social communication  – educational 
activities, dissemination of knowledge, public debates, exposure to international cultural 
influences and other ways of educating the public. However, the low level of these activities 
is part of the definition of the underdevelopment and it would be inconsistent to expect them 
to flourish in the multiply depressed, culturally sullen Southeasteuropean environments. There 
are also deeper problems in the area of multiple equilibria induced by the cognitive 
imperfections and informational deficiencies. At the level of fundamental epistemological 
difficulties one should point to the generalized identification problem which consists in the 
well known fact that a variety (in fact, infinity) of equally testable and equivalent models may 
turn compatible with available empirical evidence. They turn out equally efficient when it 
comes to explaining the underlying realities and may, at the same time, have radically 
diverging policy implications and lead to glaringly different practical decisions. Empirical 
testing does not provide a basis for discriminating among them and they invoke incompatible 
or opposed actions. If these actions are interpreted as endeavors and ventures directed to the 
institution building, still another layer of indeterminacy leading to multiple equilibria can be 
established. Namely, the set of models, mutually consistent or not, can under certain 
circumstances  lead to the same set of formal institutions, but these institutions may in 
different environments produce different results. Implication is that variegated and varying 
environments call for differentiated and evolving institutions. The same set of institutions 
cannot be optimal for differing environments, whether they are differentiated by resource 
availabilities, technologies, the flows of impacts from international surroundings… A third 
dimension of indeterminacy derives from the fact that the formal institutions are just a (smaller, perhaps minor) part of total set of institutional devices; it is only natural to observe 
that the same set of formal institutions, combined with widely differentiated informal 
institutions, has to produce commensurably differentiated results, as it is reasonable to expect 
the optimal formal institutions to vary depending on the, again widely diverging, informal 
institutions with which they will be combined. 
Another set of reasons of institutional blockade or changes which don’t pass the test of 
economic, or some more broadly defined, rationality is associated to what might be called the 
second-order imperfections of the corresponding decision-making mechanisms. As  pointed 
out in section 3.8, institution building is, just like production and investment, fraught with 
externalities, indivisibilities, public good spillovers, principal-agent relations and other 
imperfections of decentralized decision making in a milieu of widely ramified and far-
reaching interdependencies. In fact, t he interdependencies in the sphere of institutional 
engineering are much more pronounced than in the area of production and investment and the 
imperfections should be much more discernible. To the extent that institutions grow out of a 
densely interwoven set of decentralized interactions, they have to display many deficiencies 
quite apart from the fact that for most of them economic efficiency is not the only evaluation 
criterion. Unavoidable implication of the failure of the decentralized decision making system 
is to push the process into the state ambit. But, the counteracting influences are easily 
detected. Firstly, the state can’t get involved into the vast process of the formation of informal 
institutions where decentralized processes, no matter how deficient on an abstract plane, have 
to be relied on. Secondly, the state has its own collection of failures and there is no 
presumption of its being superior to the decentralized alternative on an a priori basis. The 
state, with its public choice syndrome, is likely to be less efficient in this field than in the field 
of production and investment. This inferiority in one field as compared to the other is caused 
by a set of reasons which are analogous to the corresponding inferiority of the market based 
processes of institution building compared to the performance of the same processes in the 
allocation of resources in production and investment. The Southeasteuropean tradition of 
pushing many tasks into the hands of government cannot help much because all that amounts 
to shifting the important functions from deficient or non-existing markets to the decision 
making mechanisms under the auspices of heavily bureaucratized, traditionally coercive and 
generally corrupt government. 
 3.11 Path Dependence as an Obstacle to Change and a Cause of its Misdirection 
The essential ingredient of the path dependence analysis is the idea of – sufficiently 
powerful to be relevant – groups fighting for their particular, largely incompatible and 
frequently opposed interests. The behavior of the groups cannot be explained without 
explaining of – representative or not – individuals, so that one identifies a facet  bordering on 
the traditional theory of decentralized decision making and drawing amply on its results. One 
starts with the decision making actors with their preferences, goals, attitudes, incentives and 
choices, then adds to that their opportunities, rights and constraints, including in particular the 
constraints on the available knowledge and information to end up with strategies, 
computational capabilities and behavioral patterns. 
Among the reasons accounting for the path dependence the basic one seems to be 
investment in the system specific capital, particularly the specific human capital (Dallago 
1999, pp. 110-2). Specific capital is sometimes impossible to redeploy and, when possible, 
that could be done only at high cost and considerable loss of value. Having invested into 
adjustments to a specific institutional setup, economic and social agents acquire motivation to 
preserve the resulting capital. That can only be done by avoiding change altogether or else by 
endeavoring to create particular types of change which leave the system in the neighborhood 
of the initial state. Alternatively, only those types of change are generated which are in some 
sense functionally related to the initial states or compatible with them. This is the way in which the dependence is introduced between the successive states and that is all there is to it 
when speaking about path dependence. System specific assets cannot be redeployed without 
significant loss of value. By striving to protect the value, the interacting agents introduce a 
conservative bias into the system and endogenous change, i. e. change coming from within 
the system becomes less likely and, if and when forthcoming, it becomes bent to the existing 
arrangement. Low  cognitive standards and incompatibility of the mental models formed by 
the relevant actors about underlying realities lead, as emphasized above, to multiple 
equilibria. The p ath dependence locks the models into the set of low level or otherwise 
inferior equilibria, leaving the high performance equilibria far out of the reach of the dynamic 
process of institutional transformation conceived as a series of successive adjustments. 
System specific capital and path dependence as its logical and functional corollary are 
necessarily inefficient. Inefficiency is logically implied by the fact that the system either 
adjusts incompletely or adjusts in the inadequate way. The adjustment is, namely, determined 
not by the character of exogenous change to which the adjustment is needed but by the 
specific features of the initial state. In view of the uninterrupted exogenous changes, the logic 
of adjustment based on anything else but the change  itself produces by definition 
inefficiencies. The widely diagnosed and generally recognized conservatism of 
Southeasteuropean societies automatically generates microeconomic and system-wide 
inefficiencies, which have represented an unclouded feature of all economies and societies in 
the region. This is at the same time one of the reasons because of which reliance on 
decentralized and spontaneous formation of institutions was neither desirable nor possible. 
That left the state with its system-wide engineering as the only alternative. The heavily 
bureaucratized state of the Southeasteuropean type evidently had its more than usual share of 
public choice failures and the countries in the region have permanently been in the position of 
having to chose between highly imperfect decentralized mechanisms of institutional 
adjustments and an exploitative and corrupt state. Whatever the choice, the outcome is 
unfavorable. 
There are a few specific traits of the Southeasteuropean social environments which 
have produced a distorted and in many ways ineffective set of procedures grinding out 
institutional adjustments. For one thing, the general level of knowledge was extremely low 
and the engineering of legally formalized institutional changes could not have been anything 
but poor and inadequate. This steady feature has further been exacerbated by the fact that 
institutional lags and general civilizational delays had as a rule called for big jumps in the 
adjustment of inherited institutions. Big jumps in the institutional reshaping of the society 
require, however, disproportionally high quantities of knowledge. The Southeasteuropean 
societies have thus permanently been in the situation of being in especially big need of an 
important prerequisite of the development process which has traditionally been among the 
least available. This fundamental asymmetry has been one of the invariants of the traumatic 
development experience of the region of Southeastern Europe. The second specific factor of 
what – at least from a strictly economic point of view – looks as distorted development is the 
very fact that institution building has been guided by other than economic needs and 
priorities. The principal among these has been the state and nation building and the associated 
ethnic survival and collective security. To the extent that institutions come in undiversifiable 
and indivisible blocks serving a multitude of social needs, they clearly cannot be optimal from 
the standpoint of any of these needs taken in isolation. The third peculiarity of the process of 
institution building in Southeastern Europe is the obsession of the leaders in practically all of 
these countries with power and the ways of amassing it in the shortest possible time. This 
comes out as undisputed Turkish heritage: having just exited a political rule based on crude 
force, the new leaders continued in the same style, the only one that had been known to them. 
There is ample evidence that they saw themselves playing the roles of the recently toppled alien masters and treating their own people as no more than mere objects of governing, 
manipulation and exploitation (Markovic 1946/1872/, pp. 84-6, 98-102) 
The interactions among different groups are relevant in this context, too. 
Southeasteuropean societies came out of the Turkish rule as rather homogenous collectivities 
with high degree of equality and with strong local autonomy in regulating their affairs. 
However, the prolonged liberation struggle produced, among other, significant social 
stratification. The new national elite surfaced in the process (Markovic 1946/1872/, p. 49). 
That was the seed and the beginning of a wider social stratification. The group interests 
developed and there followed their differentiation with respect to both the desirability viz. the 
speed and the directions of change. To put it in a dry and formal way, the value of transition 
changes, measured by the discounted sum of the expected future benefits for different groups, 
varied noticeably across the groups. One of the possible and even likely outcomes is  the 
stalemate, a halting of even modest changes that otherwise could have been made. 
A further feature of the situation, leading to paralyzing the group action and social 
change in its totality, are the institutional voids resulting from the external shocks and 
producing changes not intended by anyone. These voids dissolve whatever property rights 
have existed prior to exogenous changes forced upon the system. With diluted and partly 
eliminated property rights the relevant agents are not able to estimate the costs and benefits of 
the possible changes, they can’t compute the best options at reasonable cost, their cognitive 
incompetence becomes even more pronounced and the change, to the extent that it depends on 
human action and does not fall upon societies in the style of a natural disaster, becomes even 
more difficult. Institutional stagnation cannot but produce the stagnation in all important 
walks of life, including the economy. All these developments make the systemic change 
individually unprofitable despite its desirability and urgent necessity from the point of view of 
the society as a whole. Looked at in this dimension, the stalemate is one possible result of the 
partial decentralization of decision making in developing the institutions (such 
decentralization is a corollary of the statement that the group actions matter in shaping the 
final outcome) and the conflicts of interests at various levels of social organization. Such 
conflicts of interest are a natural consequence of the fact that the institutions have the usual 
characteristics of public goods, whereby – again – the publicness manifests itself at various 
levels of the social organizational hierarchy. Apart from this, the diversity of time horizons 
and their generally short length often leads to situations in which a broad collection of 
institutional changes is faltered by distinctly inconsistent and mutually nullifying decisions. 
To the extent the change would have to come from them, it will not be forthcoming; to the 
extent it happens to be engineered by the state, these agents will resist it and make it slower 
and more costly. 
The especially important characteristic of the path dependence is the fact that it mostly 
reflects the influence of the most powerful groups and the  configuration of their preferences 
and interests. The power of the relevant groups is a defining feature of the old system. It is 
through the power of the groups that the old systems of institutions determine the new ones 
and that the path dependence becomes the crucial determinant of the unsatisfactory 
institutional development in the Southeasteuropean countries. The future comes to be a 
hostage of the past. As the power has traditionally been concentrated in and around the 
government and since the state bureaucracy has persistently held the commanding positions in 
the Southeasteuropean societies, it is only natural to find out that the entire social 
development bears heavy and easily recognizable imprints of the state interventionism and the 
administrative reign. Cognitive inadequacy and informational constraints provide another 
channel through which the past heavily influences the future, making again for path 
dependence. The available knowledge determines the intellectual horizon of both 
decentralized actors of institutional adjustments and the system-wide agents of institutional engineering working under the governmental auspices. The design of the institutions-to-be 
cannot be  far from what already exists, the ideas concerning the alternative arrangements 
cannot but be conceptual shadows of the existing institutional mechanisms.  
Faced with the systemic uncertainty likely to arise from the regulative voids resulting 
from major changes, the actors rely on old ways of coordination. Such behavior recreates the 
old institutions and gives an alternative way of establishing the path dependence. Especially 
important in this context are the informal institutions which are subject to gradual change 
anyway; their evolutionary change binds successive arrangements into coherent wholes which 
also make for – or even represent – the path dependence. The conservative bias of consciously 
designed, purposefully engineered institutional adjustments, which in Southeastern Europe 
come as a reaction to too frequent and too big exogenous changes, additionally strengthens 
the inclination of local institutional developments to distinct and persistent path dependence. 
Legacy left by past investments represents a strong conservative force under all of 
circumstances but it seems to have been and continues to be especially strong in Southeastern 
Europe. Besides the already mentioned traumatic shocks in the past, the painful and costly 
disturbances that have produced the conditional reflex of avoiding and resisting any type of 
change, there are endemic reasons of rejecting the change which have to do with the modest 
levels of income and wealth. Poor individuals and groups cannot accept the substantial risks 
which are associated with significant change because in the case of failure the resulting loss 
bites into the biological substance, into very existence of individuals and groups. It is also true 
that any loss of value associated with the redeployment of resources following the changes is 
much more difficult to sustain at low income levels. Southeastern Europe has seen many 
episodes of defending the system specific capital at all costs in the face of involuntary 
changes generated by exogenous forces. The result of such a behavior under adverse 
circumstances seem to have been broken, piecewise continuous paths, to use a mathematical 
metaphor. Such paths in the multidimensional institutional spaces have exhibited an unusual 
combination of two contradictory characteristics. The frequent and large jumps gave them a 
recognizable appearance of extraordinary dynamism, while the continuous portions exhibited 
an equally recognizable conservative bent. 
3.12 The Role of the State in Southeastern Europe: Creating Institutions for a 
         Market Economy  
The institutional interdependencies between the state and the market are well known. 
Creating institutional preconditions for a market economy is a matter of governmental 
policies. Not a small number of markets appears to be simply created by the state policies. 
The market movements themselves produce pressures for certain  types of government’s 
reorganization and for specific economic policies. The influences are two-sided and the large 
and complex set of interactions between the state and the market weave themselves together 
into a nexus of multiple interdependencies which  is at the heart of any economy, be it 
rudimentary and underdeveloped or highly modernized and marked based. Governmental 
policies and market processes are distinctly complementary in large areas of their interacting, 
but there are other areas in which they are alternative devices to be relied on and where a 
recognizable relation of substitutability becomes established. Besides policies supporting and 
even creating the markets, there have surely been the policies suppressing and even 
destroying the markets. No unequivocal conclusions about the direction of influence of certain 
factors at work can be drawn.  
The only safe statement to propose is that strong influences there have been and that 
their consequences remain far-reaching. A multiply tested piece of common stock knowledge 
is that a truly democratic state can serve as a basis of a market economy despite the fact that 
not a small number of cases can be found in which non-democratic governments served very 
well as bases of the high performance market systems. European tradition  – which undoubtedly may be taken as relevant for the Southeasteuropean development prospects and 
choices – clearly leans towards democracy and provides ample evidence about democratic 
states serving as institutional fulcrums of the  market economies. Southeastern Europe has 
added another important and much more specific experience. If not subject to hard budget and 
financial discipline, the state fails despite being democratically structured and being 
embedded into a multi-party political framework. The Greek experience is in that respect 
illuminating: soft budget, conditioned by overambitious objectives regarding the state and the 
nation building, leads to public bankruptcy, to loss of sovereignty and to the state’s ceding its 
functions to some alien organization. For better or worse, that profoundly changes its role in 
the economic process and even more in the grand political choices and national strategies. 
Such turnarounds in the state’s role in the broadest and truly strategic public issues 
undoubtedly have a powerful feedback on the workings of the market and its mobilizing 
potential and allocative efficiency. Hard budget at the level of the state and governmental use 
of resources could be understood as the key constitutional precondition for a sound and 
sustainable democracy; financial disorder undermines the very foundations of the  democratic 
system and ultimately leads to the demise of the democracy itself. This does not come as a 
surprise: the crucial preconditions for many institutional mechanisms and organizational 
devices, such as various incentive schemes, have to be provided for  outside of those 
contrivances themselves. Whether democracy will work in the expected and desired way 
depends on a number of things that have to be fixed outside democracy itself. 
By shaping institutions, by setting the rules under which various economic actors will 
be able to interact and by regulating the conditions under which various economic operations 
will be conducted (Toye 1995, p. 63) the state clearly exercises a decisive influence in the 
economic processes. As repeatedly emphasized, the state has to step in when it comes down to 
many instances of institutional reshaping because the alternative decentralized devices of 
institutional adjustment suffer numerous and deep “imperfections of second order”. The 
resistance to change, evidenced at the level of the broadest decentralized social base and 
induced by the traumatic experience of the imposed and forceful past changes, is also an 
important reason for the state having to intervene in the processes of institution building. The 
third reason for the state’s intervention in the field of institution building is the above 
described (section 3.1) conservative bias caused by the centuries of alien rule in all of the 
Southeastern Europe. The alien reign produced an inclination to rely as little as possible on 
the formal rules and to regulate all walks of life by informal rules deeply ingrained in the 
people’s tradition. Such bias, together with the informal rules being less flexible under the 
foreign mastery, produced and institutional rigidity which, in view of the needs for adjustment 
brought by the modern times, had at times to be broken in by the energetic intervention of the 
state. It was implicitly hoped that the failure of the state, at least in some segments of 
institution building, would be less than the failure of various decentralized mechanisms of 
institutional adjustment. 
The evaluation of the role of the state in Southeastern Europe depends crucially on the 
underlying theory of the state. From the point of view of the strictly functionalist theory, 
particularly the one centered on narrowly defined economic functions of the state, the 
governmental policies and the ways in which the role of the state was generally exercised, 
will be graded with quite a low mark. However, if one accepts not this narrow point of view, 
germane to the  new institutional economics, but an incomparably wider standpoint, 
characteristic of the old institutional economics (Stein 1995, p. 128), one comes out with a 
radically different evaluation. The old approach ties the government not just to providing 
conditions for maximizing the economic performance but sees it as a provider for a much 
broader set of social needs. The  government in this view introduces and guarantees a 
generally conceived  order which regulates many areas of social life, including those conceptually and functionally located very far from economic processes and transactions. As 
indicated earlier in a different context, while catering to such a broad spectrum of social 
affairs, the government cannot be expected to be as efficient in any given field as it would be 
had just that field been in the center of its preoccupations. This mode of thinking does not 
focus on primarily economic institutions but looks at them in their totality and even defines 
them in a way which in the present perspective looks somewhat exotic. Namely, institutions 
are thought of as “settled habits of thought common to the generality of man” (Stein 1995, p. 
128).  
Different historical circumstances evidently bring different epochal agendas and 
different collections of the cardinal tasks that have to be performed for a long future to come. 
To such widely differentiated and continuously varying composition of the weighty historic 
tasks there certainly has to correspond a differentiated and varying mix of institutions 
primarily focussed on this or that sphere of social life. Southeastern Europe has throughout 
her recent history faced the epoch-making tasks of nation building and organization of state 
and it is in the light of that fundamental fact that the  overall performance of 
Southeasteuropean states has to be evaluated. In the historic circumstances which mark the 
epochal turn of the entire society the state is confronted by the complex and occasionally 
almost insoluble task of having to foster competition in some areas of social interacting and 
cooperation in other areas. Thus, building the institutional base of a market economy clearly 
calls for putting in place devices promoting  competition, while the nation building largely 
boils down to a cooperative enterprise. Having to lay the institutional foundations for these 
two diverse types of behavior is a great challenge for any state, not to speak of the nascent and 
in many respects quite undeveloped states in Southeastern Europe. Moreover, it is beyond 
doubt that the overall efficiency of performing these widely differing sets of functions must 
be considerably lower in comparison to a setup in which such two-pronged overall position 
didn’t exist. Or in which it, at least, did not impose itself so forcefully.  
Another disparity in the historically imposed tasks of the state came from the necessity 
of catching  up with the more advanced European countries. Economic backwardness and a 
hovering civilizational lag made it imperative to set the tasks of mobilizing all available 
resources in attempting to accelerate the development in most areas of life. Such task either 
did not exist or had a much l ower weight in the composition of commitments of other  
countries and their governments. Having a more versatile set of assignments or having one of 
them weigh so heavily in the overall agenda certainly reduces the effectiveness and reflects 
unfavorably on the overall performance. The very high demands on the governments have 
definitely contributed to their strengthening and probably to their coercive characteristics. 
This may have had adverse feedback effects on the performance itself ad contributed to the 
end result falling considerably short of expectations. If one adds to this that the catching up 
function must have put heavy demands on the knowledge and expertise, the scarcest resources 
in the region, than the general picture of complexity of the task of modernization and the 
modest chance of coming to grips with it successfully – comes out even more clearly. 
In view of the enumerated difficulties it is not surprising that much of what the 
governments did for the promotion of growth of the economies in the region had left much to 
be desired. Worthy of mention are two major drawbacks. Firstly, the incentive structures have 
most of the time been irrational. Small markets, large chunks of the economies being outside 
the markets altogether, insufficient integration into the wider international economic areas and 
diversion of a good portion of the highest quality human potential to political and 
administrative activities, not to economic entrepreneurship, created monopolized structures 
with poor valuation of resources and deficient incentives as to the options on which to engage 
them. The other prominent feature of the established machinery for mobilization and 
allocation of resources was excessive interventionism of the state, overregulation of economic activities, too many issues on which governmental permits had to be obtained and, generally 
speaking, heavy bureaucratic regimentation of all important walks of social life. 
Administrative overregulation, together with wrong signals from a closed and incomplete 
market, additionally burdened with government made monopolies, created a macroeconomic 
environment in which (1) the signals to which the market agents were supposed to react had, 
as a rule, been faulty, and (2) the actors had not been able to respond timely and appropriately 
even to such signals because of the many constraints imposed by bureaucratic overregulation. 
These are some of the fundamentally important institutional constraints on the development of 
Southeasteuropean economies, the key elements to which to turn in an attempt to explain the 
conspicuous development lag and the modest success of the endeavors to bridge it over. 
This is the context in which the power and the role of the groups should be invoked 
again. The groups are generally the agents  of institutional development attempting 
persistently to adjust changes of institutions to their own interests, pushing the – how ever 
defined – general interest into the abyss of irrelevance. The groups are the medium through 
which the interdependence between the real economic changes and institutional adjustments is  
introduced. To the extent that they influence institutional change, the groups seize a more 
favorable position in the distribution of income and become more wealthy and powerful than 
in some alternative scenario. They also adjust the institutional solutions so as to facilitate their 
own aggrandizement and consequently acquire advantages not only in the distribution but also 
in the production and investment. With thus secured increase of income  and wealth they 
presumably additionally increase their social power and political clout, making themselves  
still more effective in further steering of institutional change. The process takes on typical 
cumulative features.  
The role of the groups in developing institutions in the Southeasteuropean countries 
has been rather specific. The governmental bureaucracy has by far been the most powerful 
group, taking over all commanding levers of the society and preventing other groups to form 
themselves and strengthen, not to speak of their significant influence in shaping institutions. 
For better or worse, the group influence could be diagnosed as inconsequential. That certainly 
has reduced the typical group induced deviations in institutional development, but on  the 
other hand has increased the probability of strategic hazards and large failures because of the 
centralized bureaucracy working unencumbered, without constraining and balancing 
corrections coming from the alternative power centers. The groups might have exerted some 
influence in the field of informal institutions, but that is an ocean of rules and standards which 
only gradually evolves and in whose slow, organic development no separate social force can 
produce a discernible influence. 
The strong influence of the state brings up again the important subject of the state 
failure. Leaving aside the serious question of “the failure with respect to what, as compared 
to  what alternative”, one could assert that the problem of the state failure is the more 
important the more pronounced the intervention of the government in various spheres of 
social life. It is of some interest again to remind of the Khan’s (1995, pp. 71-3) classification 
of the state failure. Khan’s type I failure is measured by the loss of the performance of the 
existing institutions as compared to the superior performance of some alternative feasible 
institutions. If the system delivers 100 units and its institutional restructuring would raise the 
performance to 140 units, the quantitative measure of the type I failure is 40. Type II failure is 
an attribute of the transition paths and is measured by the excess of the cost of transition along 
a given (actual) path over the cost along some alternative transition path. The 
Southeasteuropean experience is certainly dominated by the type I failure.  The reasons are 
two. Firstly, all over the region the economically inefficient institutions have prevailed most 
of the time. The difference between what has been achieved on the basis of actually prevailing 
institutions and some alternative setups must have been large. This statement should be qualified by the above emphasized facet of institutional arrangements: they had to serve a 
much broader set of objectives than the purely economic ones and broader than in the rest of 
European countries. Allowance should be made for achievements along the dimensions 
corresponding to other objectives and for the fact that serving a versatile set of goals reduces 
the, no matter how measured, overall performance. The type II failure could not have been 
significant in the Southeasteuropean history. The reason lies in the fact that most changes 
have been exogenously imposed and forced upon the societies and their policies. The policy 
makers have generally not had ample  alternative transition paths to chose from; the 
dynamically defined opportunity cost could not have been high. 
          * 
This brings the study to an end. As transpires from the its structure, the strategy of 
inquiring into institutional constraints on the Southeasteuropean development is two-pronged. 
The general discussion of institutions, their significance and the way they come to be formed, 
makes up the first part of the study. The second half is devoted to applying the conceptual and 
analytical tools, developed in the first part, to the economic evolution and institutional 
experience of the region of Southeastern Europe.  
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